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1 Introduction 
 
Earnings quality: Those two words are in the central point of many discussions, 
research and analyses. Typing them as keywords into an Internet search machine, no 
matter if commercial (e.g. Google, Yahoo) or scientific (e.g. ProQuest, ScienceDirect), 
returns numerous hits. Articles from as well-know business magazines as Forbes pop 
up. The same happens for the scientific world, where research papers concerning 
earnings quality can be found in the most renowned journals. Extra issues on the 
quality of earnings exist of such papers as Accounting Horizons and the Accounting 
Review and quite a number of conferences were and are held on it. 
 
The topic – respectively aspects of it – occupies practitioners and researchers likewise 
since many years, not to say decades, but the catalyst of the recent boosted 
engagement were the big accounting scandals of companies like Enron in 2001 or 
WorldCom in 20021. This also caused an Anglo-American focus on the issue. But 
especially through the setting of international accounting standards and the influence 
of the American economy on the rest of the world, publications about earnings 
quality do exist in a not so small number outside the United States of America, too. 
 
Although the occupation with earnings quality is intense, it is still a broad and 
unclearly defined topic. Earnings quality is no stand alone topic. Related themes are 
earnings management, accrual accounting, financial reporting, information 
disclosure, valuation, auditing, corporate governance, pro-forma-earnings and cash 
flows. Therefore many different issues, views, and interests subsume this term. It is 
agreed upon that it should be a measure, but of many different things at once. Among 
others the company performance, the information provided, the (intrinsic) value of 
the firm, the company’s future performance, or the accounting quality should be 
measured. One can say that all these (to be measured) values somewhat point in the 
same direction, but it is hard to grasp them with only one number. 
 
Throughout this thesis an overview of the topic of earnings quality is given. A first 
point is to define the term, explain the usage of earnings in contrast to residual 
                                                 
1 Patsuris, 2002 
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income, pro-forma-earnings, and cash flows, and describe perspectives and 
influential factors on it. The main part is made up of the desirable and undesirable 
earnings attributes as identified by researchers, the way they are being measured, and 
their international differences. These attributes are analyzed in a setting of perfect 
markets and certainty through cash flow examples and some further critical points 
are considered for these characteristics of earnings. Thereafter the possibilities and 
attempts to measure aggregated earnings quality in two ways – theory- and practice-
based – are discussed.  A summary and conclusion form the end of this paper. 
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2 Defining Earnings Quality 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction there exists no agreed-upon definition of 
earnings quality. It is a rather context-dependent topic. At first it might help to take a 
separate look on the two terms, explain what the terms of earnings and quality stand 
for and take this into consideration for the combined definition.  
 
2.1 Earnings, Pro-Forma-Earnings, Residual Income, and 
Cash Flows 
 
The term “earnings” usually refers to the bottom line of the income statement, i.e. 
(after-tax) net income. It is the connecting part between income statement and 
balance sheet during the closing entries. As an aggregated accounting performance 
measure it shows the result of a company’s financial reporting and, in doing so, tells 
analysts, investors, management, and other interested groups about the success or 
failure of the firm, i.e. its profitability. Therefore earnings are also a main 
determinant of the company’s share price. All these make earnings “the single most 
studied number in a company’s financial statements”2. But during the last decade, 
especially since the late 1990s, it became fashionable to rather look at pro-forma-
earnings and cash flows to value a company’s performance.3 
 
Pro-forma-earnings measure earnings other than those that are calculated 
respectively formed due to generally accepted accounting principles. Examples for 
pro-forma-earnings are “EBIT” (i.e. earnings before interests and taxes) or “EBITDA” 
(i.e. earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization) and several 
variations of those two. Pro-forma-earnings are said to form a closer to market 
earnings number than GAAP earnings do. The original hope leading to the creation of 
pro-forma-earnings was that several of the problems of GAAP could be solved this 
way and those numbers would show the “permanent” respectively “true” earnings of a 
company. Through them a more unbiased view on the company should be given and 
comparisons across different companies, industries, and even countries should 
                                                 
2 Investopedia, 2008a, Earnings 
3 Cf. Penman, 2003, p. 79, Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p. 114, and Investopedia, 2008a, Earnings 
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become easier. This is done in taking out the parts of annual accounts that vary the 
most from company to company to get a common basis for comparisons. Taking out 
taxes – for instance – helps to compare companies in different tax jurisdictions, 
subtracting interest payments nulls the effect of different capital structures and 
leaving out depreciation and amortization eliminates two more non-cash items.4  
 
Table 1:  Items excluded from pro-forma-earnings, 1998-2000  
 Data source: Bhattacharya et al., 2003, pp. 294 
 
Firms try to condition their investors and analysts on certain pro-forma-earnings, e.g. 
Amazon puts the emphasis on EBIT while WorldCom promoted EBITDA.5 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003, p. 287) show that especially service and high-tech 
industries’ firms like the usage of pro-forma-earnings. While the firms claim to leave 
out non-recurring and non-cash items, the study finds that “routine expenses, which 
should be included in operating income under GAAP, are the most common types of 
                                                 
4 Cf. Investopedia, 2008b & 2008c & 2008d, EBIT, EBITDA and EBT,  Penman, 2003, p. 81, and 
Dechow & Schrand, 2004,  pp. 114 
5 Cf. Penman, 2003, p. 81 
Depreciation & amortization 
costs
22%
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pro forma adjustments”6. Table 1 shows which adjustments are made the most often 
to reach pro-forma-earnings. It has to be noted that there is no common way of 
calculating those numbers and even for one single company the composition of pro-
forma-earnings changes quite often from one period to the next. So, while these 
numbers already make intra-company-comparisons (along the time-series) difficult, 
it is clear that comparisons across companies hardly ever make sense.7  
 
This “widespread confusion about pro forma earnings”8 leads easily to the critics of 
pro-forma-earnings. With leaving out interests, taxes, depreciation, and/or 
amortization valuable information and real costs are being ignored. E.g. EBITDA 
turns a blind eye on “cash required to fund working capital and the replacement of 
old equipment, which can be significant.”9 Lynn Turner, SEC chief accountant from 
1998 to 2001, finds quite clear words on pro-forma-earnings. He calls them ““EBS” or 
“Everything but Bad Staff””10 and criticizes pro-forma-earnings for showing an 
incomplete, inaccurate and unclear picture to investors.11 These numbers can help 
management to opportunistically influence the market perception as there is 
unlimited discretion in their determination.12 This discretion is shown, e.g. in the fact 
that pro-forma-earnings meet or beat analysts’ mean forecasts in 80.1 percent while 
only 38.7 percent of the related GAAP operating earnings figures would do so.13 
 
Penman (2003, p. 81) gives two examples how firms fade out important parts of 
accounting with pro-forma-earnings: If interests are ignored the company can reach 
higher earnings with increased borrowing as it seems that they do not have to pay for 
this liability although in reality they have to and earnings are being decreased. The 
other example concerns leaving depreciation out of the picture. That way the fact that 
the value of certain assets decreases over time and incentives to rather capitalize 
expenses are created, is ignored. The effect is the same as in the previous example. 
The pro-forma-earnings are a lot higher than GAAP earnings would be, so they show 
a distorted reality and therefore a wrong performance of the company. Bhattacharya 
                                                 
6 Bhattacharya et al., 2003, p. 287 
7 Cf. Cornell & Landsman, 2003, p. 20 
8 Bellovary et al., 2005, p. 35 
9 Investopedia, 2008c, EBITDA 
10 Turner, 2000, p. 5 
11 Cf. Turner, 2000, pp. 5 
12 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, pp. 114 
13 Cf. Bhattacharya et al., 2003, pp. 301; The meeting and beating of analysts’ forecast numbers is used 
to gauge earnings management; see also Section 3.5 
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et al. (2003, pp. 300) show that pro-forma-earnings per share are in 70 percent of the 
cases higher than GAAP earnings per share. 
   
Only bottom line earnings show the whole available accounting information and thus 
the whole (available) truth about a company. Earnings are the only number to catch 
the “big picture” including all influences on a company, but as additional information 
pro-forma-earnings could profound this picture. So they are welcome in voluntary 
disclosure including an exact scheme of their calculation, but not as substitute for 
GAAP earnings. 
 
However, accounting does not always show the underlying reality exactly either. 
There are plenty of articles and papers which criticize GAAP rules for not helping 
companies to show their potential. In response to this high number of critics of GAAP 
– and hence, GAAP earnings – practitioners frequently prefer using other numbers to 
value companies. While pro-forma-earnings have been criticized in this context, 
residual income concepts are on the rise. They take the cost of equity into account 
which is ignored by GAAP.14 What is not seen by those critics is that although the 
relevance of the cost of equity is unquestioned high it is difficult to get a reliable 
number, on which generally accepted accounting principles can only be based. For 
instance EVA, i.e. economic value added, – as one residual income measure - does 
not only require the estimation of the cost of equity but many more adjustments that 
involve expert’s judgment. Additionally, different consulting firms developed 
different residual income concepts, which make the comparability delicate. So 
residual income might be the theoretically right concept and as a valuation tool show 
the value creation and destruction of a company a lot better than net income, but its 
reliability is hard to assess. 
 
While this does not solve the problems with GAAP and due to the fact that 
managerial discretion is included in accounting numbers the question arises why 
cash flows are not taken instead of earnings. After all the cash basis is what keeps a 
company operating. Without cash there is soon no business and it is much harder to 
bias cash flows than earnings. Additionally, in recent years it became compulsory not 
only for firms in the USA but also for certain mostly stock-exchange-listed European 
companies – through the application of international accounting standards like U.S.-
                                                 
14 Cf. Stewart III., 2003, p. A.16 
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GAAP or IFRS – to prepare a cash flow statement for the company’s financial 
statement, so it need not be done by analysts or investors anymore.15  
 
In the comparison between cash flows and earnings, there are two ways to look at it. 
The first deals with arguments of accounting basics, the other concerns forecasts and 
their accuracy. To follow both comparisons, but especially the first, it is important to 
note that the difference between earnings and cash flows is the accrual component. 
Putting it in a simple equation earnings tX  equal operating cash flows tCFO  plus 
accruals tA  in one period t: ttt ACFOX += .16  
 
The objective of accrual accounting can be seen from an income statement and a 
balance sheet perspective. For the first, a company’s economic (not its cash) 
performance should be shown through such principles as revenue recognition and 
matching. Hence, revenue should be recognized in the period it is earned without 
regard to the point in time when the cash really flows. Of course the same is true for 
expenses. Seen from the balance sheet perspective, a firm’s rights (assets) and 
obligations (liabilities) have to be recognized when they occur. Both sides focus on 
the basic idea of accounting, namely to record value and not cash flows.17 
 
The argument for earnings over cash flows from this accounting perspective is usually 
made due to the higher persistence of earnings, which is nothing else than the 
outcome of the usage of accruals. So, from this point of view the discussion is really 
about accruals. Except for persistence, they are also the cause of earnings being in 
general less volatile than cash flows. But they can also be used to adjust the values of 
assets and liabilities which might lead to a biasing of earnings; this is much harder 
with cash flows where this involves the cooperation with a second party. Researchers 
and practitioners likewise experience difficulties in drawing a line between the 
enhancing information content of accruals and earnings management. Therefore with 
                                                 
15 Cf. Kieso et al., 2004, pp. 190, and Küting & Weber, 2004, p. 555 
16 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, pp. 10, Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 268, and Penman, 2003, pp. 
81 
17 Cf. Kieso et al., 2004, pp. 39, Penman, 2004, pp. 44, Dechow & Skinner, 2000, p. 237 and Dechow & 
Schrand, 2004, p. 11 
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this view the dominance of earnings over cash flows depends on the quality of 
accruals.18 
 
Concerning forecasts a recent study by Liu et al. (2006) about valuations based on 
cash flows versus earnings multiples gives a quite forward answer: Forecasts based 
on earnings are better predictors than those based on cash flows.19 The study was 
carried out with data from five countries and the results were the same for all of them 
– with a statistically significant margin. In sum, forecasts based on earnings are 
better predictors of both future earnings and future cash flows. As the whole point of 
financial analyses usually is to value a company and give an outlook on the future 
firm performance, it makes more sense to use the number that is a better predictor.20 
 
Summarizing earnings are seen superior to pro-forma-earnings, because the latter 
have no universally valid method of calculation or composition and leave out 
important accounting information. Similarly, the dilemma with reliability and 
comparability makes the usage of residual income numbers problematic.  With cash 
flows earnings are preferred – despite the possibility of manipulation through 
accruals – due to their time-series properties which make them more persistent, 
more predictable and smoother than cash flows. 
 
2.2 Quality 
 
After taking a closer look on earnings and contrasting them with close-by numbers as 
pro-forma-earnings, residual income, and cash flows, it is time to turn to the subject 
of quality. Quality as defined by the Oxford Popular Dictionary is the “degree of 
excellence”, but it also refers to a “characteristic, something that is special in a […] 
thing”.21 The term of quality turns up quite often in business, but although it always 
complies with the “degree of excellence” – meaning its exact interpretation depends 
on the item whose quality is meant. The criteria for what quality represents in the 
                                                 
18 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p. 14, Dechow & Skinner, 2000, p. 237, Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, 
pp. 267; The quality of accruals will be discussed more deeply as an earnings attribute in Section 3.4 
19 For the USA Liu et al. (2006) also compared EBITDA, an above described pro-forma-earnings 
number, with earnings and the latter were again the better predictor of a company’s valuation. 
20 Cf. Liu et al., 2006, and Authers, 2007 
21 The Oxford Popular Dictionary, 1995, p. 331 
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context with human resources are different to the ones in connection with product 
quality. In order to progress we have to look at earnings and quality together now. 
 
2.3 Earnings Quality 
 
Both researchers and practical experts try to define earnings quality from different 
point of views and aspects. The first point suggested for instance by Wagenhofer and 
Dücker (2007, pp. 266) or Entwistle and Phillips (2003, p. 85) is to look at earnings 
quality from the standard setter’s view (e.g. the American FASB, IASB, or the 
German/Austrian commercial law). The annual accounts should deliver a report of 
assets, liabilities, and returns reflecting the real situation of the company. The 
information provided through financial reporting should be useful for investors, 
creditors, and other interested parties, to value the business, its potential and to be 
able to base sound decisions on it. So, high-quality earnings have high decision 
usefulness. The other point made e.g. by Penman (2003, 2004) is from an analyst’s 
view. The mere part of any analysis is usually to do forecasts. Therefore “current 
earnings are of good quality if they are a good indication of future earnings”22. 
 
These two points also reflect in theoretical approaches which try to enlighten as many 
aspects of earnings quality as possible. Dechow and Schrand (2004, p. 5) classify that 
“a high-quality earnings number is one that accurately reflects the company’s current 
operating performance, is a good indicator of future operating performance, and is a 
useful summary measure for assessing firm value”. Overall, they want earnings to 
indicate the intrinsic value of the firm. Even from the theoretical side these 
expectations on what earnings quality can stand for are extremely high, not to say 
impossible. It is hard to imagine that one tiny number even if it is the aggregate 
output of annual accounts, can fulfill all of them. 
 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) take a different approach. They define earnings as of 
high-quality when they represent Hicksian income, i.e. “the amount that can be 
consumed […] during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning 
and the end of the period”23. This definition refers to the fact that accounting 
                                                 
22 Penman, 2003, p.81 
23 Hicks, 1939 p. 176 – quoted by Schipper & Vincent, 2003, p. 97 
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earnings should actually reflect the economic income of a firm. Schipper and Vincent 
(2003) focus on decision usefulness as the major property of earnings that are close 
or equal to Hicksian income. 
 
To complete the picture two more practical inspired definitions of earnings quality 
are given: McClure (2002) writes that the key features of high-quality earnings are to 
be repeatable (and fairly predictable), controllable, and bankable. Bellovary et al. 
(2005) see the reflection of the company’s true earnings, the usefulness to predict 
future earnings as well as stability, persistence, and lack of variability as the most 
important qualities of reported earnings. Again, the prior defined points of decision 
usefulness, reflection of the real situation of the company, and the ability to forecast 
have their way into these definitions. 
 
Analysts also tend to use a red-flag-analysis of financial reports as an inverse 
definition/measure of earnings quality. They define several items in annual accounts 
that can be critical for earnings quality, such as big lease obligations, high goodwill 
and debt or revenue growth from non-operating items, and look deeper into those. 
Still, this way of looking on earnings quality requires a substantial amount of 
experience in accounting analysis and to a degree simply a good feeling, where 
something could be wrong.24  
 
As it is hard and nearly impossible to come up with measures for exactly these 
definitions and due to the problem that they are only part of a rather never-ending-
story of attempted definitions, a number of earnings attributes, i.e. favorable and 
unfavorable characteristics of earnings, were developed. Earnings quality is defined 
through the impact of the different attributes on it. Chapter 3 deals with the meaning, 
measurement and effect of these earnings attributes.  
 
2.4 Interested Parties 
 
Earnings quality is of interest to all financial statement users and stakeholders of a 
firm, but they might differ in their focus. Still, all interested parties see earnings in 
some sense as the aggregated output of a company’s accounting, which is used to 
                                                 
24 Badenhausen et al., 2005 
Defining Earnings Quality 11 
measure current performance and gives an outlook on the future. Shareholders and 
investors want their investments to pay off. They “buy earnings” as Penman (2003, p. 
80) puts it. The current earnings number decides on the to-be-paid dividends and 
thus, the personal income of an investor through the company. The decision for 
further investment is made on a valuation of the future company performance and 
hence, shareholders stand to benefit from earnings that are decision useful and a 
good indicator for future earnings. Similarly, creditors and suppliers want to gain 
insight to the soundness and solvency of a company through its earnings number. 
They consider a high (possible) liquidity as important. Regulators, standard setters 
and auditors want earnings to be consistent with generally accepted accounting 
principles. Additionally, “standard setters view the quality of financial reports as an 
indirect indicator of the quality of financial reporting standards”25 and usually focus 
on outputs like earnings when seeking feedback in this case.26 The press and analysts 
need to prepare valuations and forecasts of companies’ performance. They prefer 
earnings to be transparent and predictable, so that they can give accurate 
prognoses.27  
 
The interest of management in the quality of earnings is divided in two parts. At first 
there is their role to satisfy shareholders and other stakeholders to their expectations 
of earnings quality as identified in the previous paragraph. But there is also the 
possible connection between managerial compensation and accounting numbers as 
performance measures. If earnings are used as performance measure for managers, 
what is of quality in this scenario differs quite substantially from the ideas of the 
other interested parties. Christensen et al. (2005) take a look at earnings as 
performance measures and find that there is a tradeoff between the valuation and 
contracting purposes of accounting earnings. A more noisy measure of performance 
can reduce the risk imposed on the manager and thus requires the payment of a 
smaller risk premium. But this somewhat desired noise is due to factors that reduce 
the earnings quality in other definitions (e.g. the level of accrual estimation errors).28 
Throughout this thesis the emphasis lies with the valuation aspect of earnings quality 
but without excluding that managers try to manipulate earnings because of the 
contracting aspect. 
                                                 
25 Schipper & Vincent, 2003, p. 98 
26 Cf. Schipper & Vincent, 2003, p. 99 
27 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p.2 
28 Cf. Christensen et al., 2005 
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2.5 Influential Factors 
 
As broad as the topic of earnings quality is the many influential factors exist and are 
being discussed in the literature. It is not the aim of this paper to give an exhausting 
description but rather to summarize several important factors. 
 
Before considering any other factor it is obvious that the underlying business of a 
company has an influence on the quality of earnings. The volatility of it might be high 
and certain characteristics differ from industry to industry. The accounting policies, 
flashpoints and incentives for manipulation depend on the sector.29 Furthermore, 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) show that the earnings quality differs between public 
and private companies due to a difference in demand. Private firms tend to exchange 
financial reporting for private communication with their stakeholders. All these 
aspects have to be taken into account when considering the firm’s quality of earnings.  
 
In international comparisons otherwise exogenous factors like the general economic 
situation of a country or its system of law can create a difference in the outcome of 
earnings quality studies. The predominant form of corporate ownership, the degree 
of investor protection, the development of stock markets or the distinction between 
different legal origins and traditions can be crucial for cross-country-comparisons.30  
 
The quality of accounting is a major influencing variable on how earnings are treated 
as the aggregate output of a company’s accounting. Supposedly there is a positive 
correlation between high-quality accounting and high-quality earnings. This seems 
logical as only right and reliable numbers can be of good quality. Accounting quality 
can be split in two fields: the quality of GAAP in general and the application of GAAP 
in particular. The first refers to the fact that generally accepted accounting principles 
do not fit well for all companies. It differs in the ability to capture all value relevant 
aspects of a firm. High-growth companies, companies with intangible assets, complex 
                                                 
29 Cf. Penman, 2004, pp. 608 
30 Cf. Leuz et al, 2003, Van der Meulen, 2007, and Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006 
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transactions or a volatile business environment are not in favor of today’s way of 
financial reporting.31 
 
GAAP’s application quality depends on how the choice among several possible 
methods, estimates, and procedures is used. So a simple fulfillment of generally 
accepted accounting principles is not enough, but it is rather required that the 
accounting reflects the company’s operations truthfully even if the regulations leave a 
possibility to choose among various rules.32 Regulation authorities like the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission tried to tighten up accounting rules during the 
last years – especially after such accounting scandals like Enron’s – to force 
company’s into high accounting quality. At this point it is hard to say if it works out. 
Arya et al. (2003, p. 115) describe the connection between accounting standards and 
quality as follows: 
“Even if we think financial reporting could take photograph-like “true” pictures of 
firms, the relationship between financial reporting and business is not like that of a 
photographer and a landscape. It is more like that between a photographer and a 
model: the model smiles and poses for the camera even as the photographer changes 
camera angle and settings in reaction to the model.” 
 
A factor that has a strong association to the application quality of GAAP as well as the 
transaction timing quality of a business, but which is also considered an important, 
self-dependent influence on earnings quality is earnings management respectively 
earnings manipulation. It is defined to be connected negatively with earnings, 
accounting and transaction timing quality. In fact the (degree of) existence of 
earnings management is often used as an inverse measure for earnings quality. So, 
ceteris paribus, the less earnings are managed the higher their quality. The 
relationship seems very straight-forward as manipulated earnings do not show a true 
picture of the firm. In line with the connection to transaction timing and GAAP 
application quality, the so-called real earnings management exists, which involves 
revenue and expenditure timing, and the manipulation of accruals.33 Earnings 
management is also used as an earnings attribute and will be discussed as such in 
Section 3.5. 
 
                                                 
31 Cf. Penman, 2004, p. 604 and Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p. 3 
32 Cf. Penman, 2004, p. 604 
33 Cf. Penman, 2004, pp. 604, and Dechow & Schrand, 2004, pp. 39 
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Corporate governance structures and monitoring play another major role among the 
influences on earnings quality. The focus lies especially with internal and external 
auditing as a controlling force of the firm, but the board of directors, institutional 
investors, analysts, or the press can also be considered as monitors.34 Dechow et al.’s 
(1996) study on the manipulation of earnings showed that companies with weak 
governance structures are more likely to be the subject of SEC enforcement actions, 
i.e. through the engagement in serious and detected manipulation of earnings. They 
found in particular that these firms had a greater proportion of insiders on the board 
of directors, who held a greater proportion of total board stockholdings and the 
majority of the board seats; the companies were less likely to have audit committees 
or outside block holders and the CEO was more often the chairman of the board or/ 
and the original founder of the company as in the control sample of firms.35 Since at 
the time of this study several legislation reforms were made (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 in the U.S. or the adaptation of corporate governance codices around the 
world), which addressed those flaws in corporate governance e.g. through 
strengthening the independence and expertise of audit committees.36 The overall 
conclusion is that the better corporate structures are the better is the earnings 
quality. The relationship is assumed this way, because if the monitoring works, for 
instance, (attempted) earnings management will be discovered early enough to 
ensure high-quality accounting and therefore a high-quality earnings number. If the 
structures are set right there might be no incentive for manipulations from the very 
beginning. There are quite a number of further studies that investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality on various more 
detailed aspects, e.g. Big 6 auditors expertise (Krishnan, 2003) or auditors’ fees for 
nonaudit services (Frankel et al., 2002).  
 
Auditors, which are seen as the first control authority, have an important part in 
monitoring. If the audit quality is high, it can be assumed that grey areas in 
accounting rules are not interpreted for the company in a manipulation promoting 
way. Then again a qualified audit opinion gives a very bad sign towards earnings 
quality.37 
 
                                                 
34 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, pp. 62 
35 Cf. Dechow et al., 1996,  pp. 21 
36 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, pp. 64 
37 Cf. Penman, 2004. p. 604 
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A last influential factor is disclosure quality. It actually has no direct influence on 
earnings, but sets the basic conditions for a financial analysis. Based on the numbers 
in disclosed financial reports e.g. investors and analysts can examine the quality of 
earnings. Even if earnings quality would be high otherwise, if it cannot be observed 
through the given data, analyses, valuations, and forecasts get tentative and might 
not show the actual performance of the firm.38 
 
As with the broad, complex, and context-dependent issue of earnings quality 
common plenty of influential factors can be thought of. The way they influence 
earnings quality seems usually logical and among the influences there are again 
connections. For instance, corporate governance structures form the background so 
that earnings management at best does not exist and accounting quality is high, 
which in sum would lead to high-quality earnings. The downside is the difficulty of 
finding out exact and quantifiable data about the influences as they themselves again 
depend on various factors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Cf. Penman, 2004,  pp. 605 
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3 Earnings Attributes 
 
Earnings attributes refer to certain desirable as well as undesirable characteristics of 
earnings that are supposed to have an influence on earnings quality. The eight most 
stated attributes are described here. They can be split into accounting- and market-
based attributes, i.e. those which are only taking accounting numbers into 
consideration and those which compare accounting and stock market numbers. The 
first three (persistence, predictability, volatility & smoothness) illustrate the time-
series properties of earnings, i.e. how earnings develop over time. 
 
3.1 Persistence 
 
“Components that are generated by repetitive business are called core income, 
persistent earnings, sustainable earnings, or underlying earnings.”39 Hence, 
persistent earnings are current earnings that are likely to be maintained in the future. 
They are repetitive, continuous and recurring. Therefore effects that are non-
recurring are impermanent. In the annual accounts these items are often seen as 
unfavorable respectively non-representative of the firm’s performance. In the 
calculation of pro-forma-earnings they are usually excluded in order to show the 
company’s real performance.40 
 
In the connection with earnings quality, persistence is seen as favorable and some 
definitions of it depend only on the characteristic of earnings as persistent and 
sustainable41: The more persistent the earnings the higher the quality.  
 
But why is persistence a positive attribute of earnings? The favorability lies in the 
recurring part. The bigger the recurring component of earnings the easier they are to 
foresee. It makes forecasts easier and more reliable. Earnings become more useful for 
decisions and risk is reduced in taking away variability. It seems as if all interested 
parties profit: Analysts can give better forecasts, managers can plan more accurately, 
and investors have more reliable information.  
                                                 
39 Penman, 2004, p. 389 
40 For a more detailed explanation of pro-forma-earnings see Section 2.1 
41 Cf. Richardson, 2003,  p. 49 
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The critical part of persistence lies with its origin. If the sustainability of earnings is 
the outcome of a very stable, recurring business background it is for sure positive. 
The “but” comes with the always existing possibility of managed earnings42. As 
persistent earnings give such a positive picture of the firm and are very practicable for 
the interested parties, there is a high incentive to somehow “help” earnings to be 
recurring. Different studies found out that certain depreciation treatments and 
accounting rules can increase persistence but reduce the decision usefulness and 
therefore the quality as those practices do not represent the underlying business 
operations.43 So although persistence is usually seen as positive towards earnings 
quality, this possibility has to be considered.  
 
In terms of measurement the persistence of earnings is usually measured through a 
simple regression equation. Next year’s earnings 1, +tiX  equal the constant α  plus the 
persistence coefficient β  times this year’s earnings tiX ,  plus the random term ti,ε : 
tititi XX ,,1, εβα +⋅+=+ . As persistence is measured through the slope coefficient, the 
earnings recur the more the higher β .44 Based on other research Wagenhofer and 
Dücker (2007, pp. 271) also suggest the possibility of splitting this year’s earnings in 
the equation into cash flows from operations and accruals to differentiate the 
influence of those two earnings components, i.e. titititi ACFOX ,,2,11, εββα +⋅+⋅+=+ . 
However, the connection between 1β  and 2β  is unclear and not analyzed.  
 
Dechow and Schrand (2004, p. 13) present a ranking of the persistence of different 
income and cash flow statement items through using the first regression equation 
with the data of American companies between 1987 and 2002. The highest 
persistence is shown with sales numbers. The fact that the tested income statement 
and thus earnings numbers all have a higher persistence than the different cash flows 
adds to the argument for earnings as of Section 2.1. But it also gives rise and an 
explanation to the usage of pro-forma-earnings numbers as they tend to have a 
higher persistence. 
 
                                                 
42 Earnings management will be discussed more deeply in Section 3.5. 
43 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, pp. 5 
44 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 271, Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p. 12, or Francis et al., 2004, p. 
980 
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Table 2: Persistence of Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Items, 1987- 2002 
 Source: Dechow/Schrand, 2004, p. 13 
 
Additionally, Dechow and Schrand (2004, pp. 24) find, that the cash flow component 
of earnings is more persistent than the accrual component, i.e. expressed through the 
parameters of the second regression equation: 21 ββ > . They state that persistence of 
both earnings and cash flows is related to the magnitude of accruals. So in connection 
to Section 2.1 of this thesis, this means that in terms of persistence even though 
earnings are of better use in financial analysis than cash flows, earnings have to be 
highly backed by cash to achieve that.  
 
3.2 Predictability 
 
Predictability captures the ability of earnings to predict themselves or/and cash 
flows. FASB and IASB as well as other standard setters see it as a very relevant and 
important property of earnings. Analysts logically like a high predictability as it 
makes their life easier in reducing risk of their predictions about the company’s 
(future) value. Additionally, predictability gives the impression of a stable setting of 
the company. These reasons make it also popular for management or investors. 45  
 
                                                 
45 Cf. Francis et al., 2004, p. 972, and Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 272 
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When measuring predictability the same regression equations as for persistence are 
used. The connection between persistence and predictability is pretty straight-
forward: The more persistent the earnings the more predictable they are. Thus, 
predictability is measured through the determination coefficient R2, i.e. the 
explanatory power, of the equations tititi XX ,,1, εβα +⋅+=+  resp. 
titititi ACFOX ,,2,11, εββα +⋅+⋅+=+ . The higher R2 is the higher is the predictability 
and therefore earnings quality.46 Based on Lipe (1990) Francis et al. (2004, p. 980) 
use the standard deviation of the error term, i.e. )( ,tiεσ , to determine earnings’ 
predictability. The smaller this standard deviation is the more predictable are the 
earnings. 
 
Another approach is to directly measure the predictability of earnings towards future 
cash flows. The regression equations from before are adjusted as follows: Either cash 
flows from operations are only being forecasted through earnings or they are split in 
(past) cash flows from operations and accruals, i.e. tititi XCFO ,,1, εβα +⋅+=+  resp. 
titititi ACFOCFO ,,2,11, εββα +⋅+⋅+=+ . Again, predictability can be measured either 
through the explanatory power R2 of the equations or the standard deviation of the 
error terms. It was found that the R2 for the equation with split up earnings is higher 
and it gets the higher the more fractionalized components are used.47 
 
Wagenhofer and Dücker (2007, pp. 272) point out that it does not only need to be the 
time-series property of earnings that defines the predictability of earnings. There are 
additional information sources like the outlook part of the company’s annual report, 
speeches of the top management, newspaper articles, or the company’s long-term 
strategic goals. There is plenty of voluntary disclosure that enhances predictability, 
but it is hard to quantify. 
 
The argument against predictability is again earnings management. As analysts 
prepare forecasts, managers try to meet (and at best beat) them. This is a very high 
incentive to manage earnings as “naturally” this would not always be possible, but the 
consequences of providing less than expected earnings are too severe. “Because 
investors tend to punish a stock if the numbers come in below the Street’s 
                                                 
46 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 271 
47 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 273, and Barth et al., 2001, pp. 43 
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expectations, companies often will do what they can to ensure that targets are hit, 
even if it means selling a few assets or tossing in a restructuring charge or taking their 
eye off of the longer term.”48  
 
The abandonment of providing earnings guidance, i.e. earnings estimates, at some 
major companies like Coca-Cola Inc. goes along these lines. Giving forecasts of their 
own earnings and then trying to meet them at “no matter what” rather equals 
“[setting] artificially low targets and then do everything possible to meet them”49 and 
making self-fulfilling prophecies. The numbers get hallow and do not provide a 
description of the company’s potential anymore. Coca-Cola Inc. or Intel Corp. now 
put their emphasis on long-term goals and additional information that helps 
investors to understand the status-quo of the firm as well as its future possibilities.50 
So these companies shift from the easily quantifiable parts of predictability to the 
more difficult ones. 
 
3.3 Volatility & Smoothness 
 
The third time-series-based earnings attribute is volatility respectively smoothness. 
The latter refers to “the relative absence of variability”51, i.e. the smoother the 
earnings the less volatile they are. The less volatile the more predictable and 
persistent are earnings and hence, the higher is their quality. Cash flows are relatively 
volatile in comparison to earnings as accrual accounting “smoothes” through the 
usage of both the matching and the revenue recognition principle.52 Pro-forma-
earnings tend to be smoothest as the variable, one-time items are usually cancelled 
out in addition to the effects of accrual accounting. As Ball et al. (2000, p. 15) state, 
“volatility can be reduced, at the expense of timeliness”.  
 
Volatility is always connected with risk. Hence, for management compensation 
contracts, which use accounting numbers as performance measures, smooth earnings 
seem preferable as they reduce risk for the managers. Moreover, “arguments that 
                                                 
48 McKay & Brown, 2002, p. A.3 
49 Jensen, 2001, p.101 
50 Cf. McKay & Brown, 2002, p. A.3 
51 Schipper & Vincent, 2003, p. 101 
52 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 273 
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smoothness is a desirable earnings attribute derive from the view that managers use 
their private information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuations 
and thereby achieve a more representative, hence more useful, reported earnings 
number.”53 Practice-oriented earnings quality definitions see smoothness as desirable 
as well. For instance McClure (2002) calls for controllability of earnings, i.e. the 
absence of risk and volatility. 
 
Among others54 Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 237) define “income smoothing” as a 
certain form of earnings management. This corresponds to the fact that Leuz et al. 
(2003) use smoothness as a measure for earnings management arguing that 
smoothing happens through accruals respectively what is known as the accounting 
discretion and it hides poor current performance. The scope in which smooth 
earnings go from improving the decision usefulness of earnings to implying earnings 
management is rather narrow and, as so often, unclearly defined.55 Again, the 
question that lies behind the smoothness of earnings is if it refers to the actual state 
of the firm. If earnings are artificially smoothed they do not represent faithfully the 
current operation of the business. Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 240) give an 
example of income smoothing that shows the ambivalence of the topic: 
“Consider a company whose software product must be continuously upgraded and 
supported to maintain market share. Customers pay cash for the product up-front, 
and the company defers recognition of part of this revenue because management 
believes the revenue is not earned until customer support has been provided. The 
deferred revenue is recognized as support is provided and uncertainties about the 
costs of support are resolved, so that the proportion of revenue that is deferred may 
vary from quarter to quarter. As it turns out, the estimates managers make to 
implement this revenue recognition policy mean that when sales are unusually high 
relatively more is transferred into the unearned revenue reserves, and conversely 
when sales are unusually low (in periods, say, right before new versions of popular 
software are released). Thus, because of management’s best judgments about when 
their firm’s revenues from this product are earned, reported revenues and earnings 
are smoother than would otherwise occur were revenue to be recognized entirely at 
the point of sale.” 
 
To identify the extent of smoothness of earnings two measures have been developed. 
The first measure compares the volatility/smoothness of earnings and cash flows 
from operations: 
)(
)(
,
,
ti
ti
CFO
X
σ
σ
. As the difference of earnings and cash flows is defined 
                                                 
53 Francis et al., 2004, p. 972 
54 E.g. Shaw, 2003 
55 Cf. Dechow & Skinner, 2000, pp. 237 
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through accruals, their smoothing effect is measured through this number. It should 
not be used to compare companies of different branches as the industry specific 
volatility of business is included in this number which might cause distortions in a 
cross-sectional analysis. The second measure refers to the correlation between the 
change in accruals and cash flows from operations: ),( ,, titi CFOA ΔΔρ . As accounting 
accruals smooth out the cash flows volatility this correlation is supposed to be 
negative.56  
 
If earnings are smooth, the first measure should be below one and the correlation 
negative. The smaller these numbers are the higher the earnings quality should be. 
However, with the earnings-management-interpretation of smoothness, small values 
of the measures indicate low earnings quality. In addition, Leuz et al. (2003, p. 510) 
point out that the correlation between the change of accruals and cash flows has to be 
highly negative to indicate managed earnings. So, the smoothness respectively 
volatility of earnings can be measured quite easily, but research does not agree on the 
sign it gives towards earnings quality.57 
 
3.4 Quality of Accruals 
 
As already described in the previous chapter and sections, accruals mark the 
difference between cash and value flows and are the result of the matching and the 
revenue recognition principle. “The rationale for accrual accounting is the attempt to 
match costs with related revenues, to better reflect underlying economic 
performance.”58 Wagenhofer and Dücker (2007, p. 274) identify accruals as the extra 
information gained trough accounting. Earnings are composed of cash flows and 
accruals. As mentioned before with smoothness, accruals filter the volatility of cash 
flows and thus, their quality is systematically related to firm and industry 
characteristics. 
 
Negative associations with accruals are due to the discretion that comes with their 
determination. The discretion can help to improve informativeness – e.g. when 
                                                 
56 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 273 
57 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 274 
58 Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 1, FASB, 1978, para. 44 – quoted by Marnet, 2007, p. 199 
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managers use their private information for accounting choices - but this comes at the 
cost of estimations and valuations of future conditions. As with all estimations there 
is always the chance of estimation errors. Those errors create noise, reduce the 
information benefit of accruals, and allow an easy entrance to earnings management 
as the distinction between real and intended mistakes is difficult. The part of accruals 
that is caused by earnings management is called “discretionary” or is referred to as 
“abnormal accruals”.59   
 
When measuring the quality of accruals researchers try to quantify the amount of 
abnormal accruals. The bigger the value of discretionary accruals the higher is the 
evidence of earnings management and the lower the accrual and earnings quality.60 
This is the basic setting of the often cited and further developed model of Jones 
(1991).61 In this model, that is mainly used to measure the degree of earnings 
management, the discretionary part of total accruals is calculated through a 
comparison with the prior period and the elimination of exogenous factors, i.e. those 
that rather affect the whole industry rather than a single firm.  
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) developed one of the recently most used measures for 
accrual (and hence earnings) quality. They measure how much accruals succeed in 
filtering the volatility of cash flows. Their focus lies on working capital accruals and 
the influence of last, this, and next year’s cash flows on them to include the different 
timing of receipt respectively disbursement of cash flows and their recognition in 
earnings. The accruals are measured through the change in working capital. They use 
the following equation: tititititi CFObCFObCFObbWC ,1,3,21,10, ε+⋅+⋅+⋅+=Δ +− , i.e. the 
change in working capital in one period equals last, this, and next periods cash flows 
from operations plus an error term. Accrual estimation errors are depicted through 
the residuals of this regression. Finally, the standard deviation of these residuals 
)( ,tiεσ  is used as Dechow and Dichev’s (2002, p. 36) “firm-specific measure of quality 
of accruals and earnings, where a higher standard deviation signifies lower quality.” 
Through this measure intentional and unintentional estimation errors are not 
differentiated as Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that both kinds of errors imply a 
                                                 
59 Cf. Marnet, 2007, p. 199, and Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 274 
60 Cf. Aboody et al., 2005, p. 655 
61 E.g. Dechow et al. (1995), Francis et al. (2005), Aboody et al. (2005), Dechow & Schrand (2004) 
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low quality of accruals and earnings. So the difference between real errors and 
earnings management is left in the dark.62 
 
In their paper Dechow and Dichev (2002, pp. 46) discover that accrual quality is 
negatively related to the absolute magnitude of accruals, the length of the operating 
cycle, loss incidence, and the standard deviation of sales, cash flows, accruals, and 
earnings, and it is positively related to firm size. Besides, they find a strong positive 
relation between accrual quality and earnings persistence. 
 
Francis et al. (2005) study the link between accrual quality, which they measure 
through an adapted version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, and the cost of 
capital. They use the quality of accruals as a proxy for information risk, i.e. “the 
likelihood that firm-specific information that is pertinent to investor pricing 
decisions is of poor quality”63. Additionally they split accruals into an “innate”, i.e. 
reflecting the true underlying performance of the business, and a “discretionary” part. 
They find that the major portion of accruals is indeed innate and the pricing effect of 
this part is substantially higher. Therefore, investors react on the source of 
information risk and the quality of accruals.64 
 
3.5 Earnings Management 
 
The term earnings management is one of the most connected with earnings quality. It 
seems as much discussed as earnings quality itself. There are several reasons for this 
fact: First, it constitutes one of the influences on the quality of earnings. Second, it is 
one of the attributes of earnings, and finally, it is often used as an inverse measure of 
earnings quality. This strong connection is also acknowledged with the fact that most 
earnings attributes that are used to define earnings quality are used for the 
explanation of earnings management, too. For nearly each other earnings attribute in 
this chapter a reference to earnings management is included. What is inherent in all 
cases is the negative effect of earnings management on earnings quality.65 It seems 
logical that highly managed earnings have low quality but to draw the inverse 
                                                 
62 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 274 
63 Francis et al., 2005, p. 296 
64 Cf. Francis et al., 2005, p. 321 
65 Cf. e.g. Kieso et al., 2004, pp. 126 
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conclusion is critical as the absence of earnings management does not cancel out 
other influential factors on earnings and their quality. Still, ceteris paribus, there is a 
strong connection between earnings management and earnings quality and thus, 
measures build on that.66 
 
What exactly is earnings management? Two popular definitions67 were given by 
Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) in their reviews respectively 
commentaries on earnings management and the linked research: 
? “By “earnings management” I really mean “disclosure management” in the sense 
of a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the 
neutral operation of the process).”68 
? “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.”69 
 
The emphasis in both definitions lies with the intent of manipulation to show a 
“better picture” of the company or mask some flaws in the operations due to different 
reasons. Kieso et al. (2004, p. 126) also call earnings management “the planned 
timing of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to smooth out bumps in earnings”. 
Thus, earnings can be managed both, upwards and downwards depending on the 
desired effects.  
 
Although fraud can be seen as the extreme version of earnings management it is 
usually not meant by researchers. Usually earnings management ranges in order of 
severity from within-GAAP choices that do not reflect the underlying company 
performance correctly to those that provoke a qualified audit opinion to SEC 
enforcement actions.70 
 
Only very few argue towards earnings management. E.g. Arya et al. (2003, p. 111) 
advance the view that after a certain point increased transparency of financial 
reporting is not of advantage to shareholders anymore. They produce the argument 
that in extreme it equals the installment of monitoring cameras in offices, which – 
                                                 
66 Cf. Lo, 2007, p. 2 
67 E.g. used by Dechow  & Schrand (2004), Nelson et al. (2003), or Dechow & Skinner (2000) 
68 Schipper, 1989, p. 92 
69 Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 368 
70 Cf. Dechow & Skinner, 2000, Dechow et al., 1996, and Nelson et al., 2003 
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against initial intentions – does not increase but decreases performance. Their point 
seems to be made from a rather psychological angle. 
 
Formally two forms of earnings management are differentiated. The first is the so-
called real earnings management. It is the form that gets less attention from research 
and describes the manipulation of real transactions. Usually this kind of earnings 
management neither interferes with GAAP nor results in a qualified audit opinion.71 
Examples are channel stuffing respectively trade loading, where for instance high 
discounts are offered to consumers to make them buy more goods now rather than 
later. The outcome of these (mal)practices is that actual future revenues are booked 
today and financial statements are window dressed this way.72 Overall, real earnings 
management includes the interference with other parties to make it work and hence, 
comes at quite more cost than the second form of earnings management, i.e. the 
manipulation of accruals through intended errors and misstatements. Although real 
earnings management is more costly and seems to involve more managerial effort as 
other parties are involved, there are studies suggesting that managers “prefer” real 
earnings management.73 Lo (2007, p. 4) argues that they take the burden of higher 
cost in exchange for the fact that these manipulations are harder to detect. He 
reasons that while accounting standards are a benchmark that accountants and 
auditors are bound to74 there are no concrete benchmarks for all existing and 
upcoming business situations and the “business judgment rule” is widely adjustable. 
Still, researchers rather deal with the management of accruals. As Dechow and 
Schrand (2004, p. 40) explain it: “In this method, the company does not change its 
activities but, rather, opportunistically reports income for an existing activity.” So, 
management uses their room to maneuver in a discretionary way. They benefit from 
the fact that in accrual accounting forecasts, estimates, and judgments have to be 
used and thus can be misused.75 This reduces the information of financial reporting 
and adds to the so-called opacity of earnings.76 
 
                                                 
71 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p. 39 
72 Cf. Kieso et al., 2004, p. 907 
73 Cf. Lo, 2007, p. 4 
74 This fits with the hypothesis of Barton and Simko (2002) that earnings management is actually 
limited through the balance sheet. 
75 Cf. Dechow & Schrand, 2004, p. 40 
76 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 275 
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A wide variety of possibilities to manage earnings exists and they have been of high 
concern to regulators since quite some years. An American study by Nelson et al. 
(2003)77 shows that earnings management is attempted within all parts of annual 
accounts with the “manipulation through revenue recognition” appearing narrowly 
the most. In all categories the attempt to increase current period income is highest.  
 
In his famous speech “The numbers game” in 1998 Arthur Levitt, chairman of the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission from 1993 to 2001, identified five 
popular illusions that are created by earnings management and quite frequently 
stated in the financial press and related research: 
? “Big bath” charges – overestimated charges associated with companies 
restructuring their business. 
? Creative acquisition accounting – e.g. the abnormal creation of big one-time-
charges or liabilities in the process of a consolidation, acquisition, or spin-off. 
? “Cookie jar reserves” – overstatement of liabilities during “good years” to smooth 
out earnings through reversing the so created accruals during “bad years”. 
? Materiality – intentional recording of errors up to a certain percentage with the 
argument that their impact on earnings is to small to matter78. 
? Revenue recognition – namely boosting earnings through the premature 
recognition of revenue. 
All these illusions are created as earnings management misuses the flexibility in 
accounting that gives it the possibility to keep up with the business environment.79 
 
As descriptive as earnings management definitions seem to be, they are hard to 
quantify empirically. This is also due to the fact that earnings management is more 
efficient the harder it is to discover. Therefore, research does not only focus on 
accrual earnings management, but also on some “easier” factors, that are said to 
describe a shape of earnings management. Into this category fall most of the other 
characterized earnings attributes as well as some further measures.  
 
                                                 
77 They present a sample of 515 earnings management attempts identified through 253 auditors. 
78 Cho et al. (2003) show that the users’ tolerance of financial statement errors (in the sense of misuse 
of materiality) is equal and below 0.3 percent, which lies way below the “materiality ceiling of six 
percent earnings” which was heavily criticized by Levitt (1998, p. 5) 
79 Cf. Levitt, 1998, pp. 3 
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Auer (2004, pp. 256) gives an example of one of those rather simple ratios. He 
actually defines earnings quality as the ratio of operative cash flows and earnings, i.e. 
ti
ti
X
CFO
,
, . Ignoring the possibility of real earnings management, he considers cash 
flows as a number of insusceptible control. Thus, the lower the ratio is the higher the 
executed earnings management. Another ratio compares the absolute values of 
accruals and cash flows: 
ti
ti
CFO
A
,
,
. The higher the value of this measure the higher is 
the degree of earnings management.80 
 
Alternative Methods focus on accruals trying to partition them in normal tiNA ,  and 
discretionary accruals tiDA , , i.e. tititi DANAA ,,, += . A basic approach was formulated 
by Jones (1991) which was complemented and expanded over the years.81 The 
consideration behind it is that the magnitude of discretionary, thus manipulated, 
accruals in comparison with total assets shows the degree of earnings management.82 
 
There is also the possibility of measuring earnings management through the 
meeting/beating of forecasts or special benchmarks and loss avoidance. Small 
earnings surprises are measured e.g. by Barton and Simko (2002). Not at last with 
this way of measurement it becomes clear that empirically the difference between 
favorable earnings attributes, such as predictability or smoothness, and earnings 
management is quite a hard one to make. Managers try everything to reach these 
attributes, including manipulation of earnings, to satisfy the environment’s 
expectations. It is the vicious cycle that earnings management creates. Levitt (1998, 
pp. 2) describes it strikingly: 
“… companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order to grow 
market capitalization and increase the value of stock options. Their ability to do this 
depends on achieving the earnings expectations of analysts. And analysts seek 
constant guidance from companies to frame those expectations. Auditors, who want 
to retain their clients, are under pressure not to stand in the way.” 
 
This corresponds to the reasons explained in Section 3.2 why several well-known 
listed companies stopped providing earnings guidance. With the meeting of capital 
                                                 
80 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 276 
81 See also Section 3.4 
82 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 276 
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market expectations and valuations an important cause and motive for earnings 
management was already described. Others, as identified e.g. by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000), Schipper (1989), include contracts on the basis 
of accounting numbers (management compensation and lending contracts), and 
government regulations.   
 
3.6 Timeliness 
 
Timely recognition of earnings means that if the performance or value of a company 
changes it should be quickly seen in earnings. The closer the recognition of events the 
better it is in terms of earnings’ timeliness. It enhances the decision usefulness of 
financial reporting as financial statement users have the latest numbers and news on 
hands and thus, earnings quality is improved, too. Through timely income statement 
recognition variables and ratios based on the financial reporting are also revised and 
updated in a timely fashion. Timeliness also refers to the fact that accounting 
earnings are initially intended to measure economic income.83  
 
Research shows that bad news is mostly recognized quicker than good news. So the 
timeliness of bad news in earnings is higher.84 The obvious reason for this seems to 
be conservatism as the faster recognition of losses and write-down of assets is a key 
point of it. A lower verification standard is required for the booking of decreases in 
income, i.e. losses, than increases, i.e. gains.85 Further research of Shaw (2003, p. 
1050) provides evidence that this asymmetry in the timeliness of earnings is only 
shown to the news by firms with lower-quality disclosures while it does not occur 
with high-quality disclosure firms.  
 
Together with conservatism timeliness forms the concept of transparency of earnings 
and financial reporting, which is logically seen as a favorable attribute of earnings.86 
Putting conservatism, which is one cause for the asymmetric recognition of earnings, 
                                                 
83 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 277,  Francis et al., 2004, p. 972, and Ball & Shivakumar, 2005, 
pp. 84 
84 Cf. e.g. Basu, 1997, or Watts, 2003a&b 
85 Cf. Ball &  Shivakumar., 2005, pp. 86, and Basu, 1997, pp. 4 
86 Cf. Francis et al. 2004, p. 973, and Ball et al., 2000, p. 2 
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into the concept of transparency seems a bit strange at first, but Ball et al. (2000, p. 
2) explain it this way:  
“In comparison with a system that allows economic losses to be reflected in 
accounting income gradually over time, timely incorporation of economic losses in 
accounting income incents managers to stem the losses more quickly. Because 
accounting income flows into balance sheet accounts, conservatism as we define it 
also makes leverage and dividend restrictions binding more quickly. It makes 
optimistic non-accounting information released by managers less credible to 
uninformed users. Conservative accounting thus facilitates monitoring of managers 
and of debt and other contracts, and is an important feature of corporate 
governance.” 
 
To measure timeliness a reference number is needed, for which stock returns are 
usually used. As so often this reference depends on the fact that capital markets are 
(close to) perfect and stock returns equal the economic income. The coefficient of 
determination R2 of the following reverse regression equation measures earnings’ 
timeliness: titi
ti
ti R
P
X
,,
1,
, εβα +⋅+=
−
. The ratio of earnings tiX ,  and market capitalization 
1, −tiP  equals stock returns tiR ,  and an error term ti,ε . The higher the explanatory 
power R2 of the equation is the better the timeliness of earnings and hence, their 
quality.87 
 
3.7 Conservatism 
 
Defining conservatism in accounting is not easy. Although there are many indicators 
for this practice definitions vary in their articulateness and focus. Still, it has a central 
role in accounting theory, research and practice. 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005, pp. 89) explain the existence of two versions of 
conservatism, conditional and unconditional. The first is a “bias conditional on firms 
experiencing contemporaneous economic losses”88. The other one refers to the 
reporting of low book values of stockholder equity – through the understatement of 
assets, the overstatement of liabilities, or both. The latter is independent from the 
actual earnings number of the period. They also see it connected to the German (and 
also Austrian) “Vorsichtsprinzip” (prudence principle) which justifies the 
                                                 
87 Cf. Francis et al., 2004, pp. 972, and Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 277 
88 Ball & Shivakumar., 2005, p. 89 
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unconditional carrying out of conservative accounting principles. Along these lines 
the asymmetric recognition of losses and gains is usually portrayed as conditional, 
the understatement of book values – independent of this asymmetry – as 
unconditional conservatism.89 
 
Generally speaking conservative accounting means that if there is doubt the smaller 
value for an asset should be taken.90 If there is uncertainty how much an asset is 
worth, maybe it is better to expense the costs instead of putting something on the 
balance sheet that is not reliable. So, accounting methods are chosen “that keep book 
values of net assets relatively low.”91 Usually conservative accounting leads to an 
understatement of book values compared to their real value.92 It is also characterized 
by the anticipation of all losses, but not of profits. Losses are therefore faster 
recognized than gains.93 This leads to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
described in Section 3.6. 
 
Liberal accounting on the contrary refers to the writing up of assets, so that it 
represents the opposite to conservative accounting. The line between these two 
concepts is drawn by the so-called neutral accounting. It results in expected returns 
on equity which equal the internal rate of return. Therefore the residual income 
becomes zero if the investment does not add value. This, however, cannot be said of 
liberal or conservative accounting. They both bias future profitability: liberality 
lowers, conservatism increases it. 94 
 
At a first glance, conservatism might seem preferable over liberal accounting. If 
assets are understated and liabilities are overstated, it makes the company look 
poorer than it actually is, but one can also see it as hidden potential. If the economic 
situation gets rougher it still has some reserves. With liberal accounting the company 
might try to show its future potential, but the creation of bubbles that the firm cannot 
live up to is possible as well.  
 
                                                 
89 Cf. Beaver & Ryan, 2005, pp. 269, and Brown, Jr. et al., 2006, p. 607 
90 Cf. Kieso et al., 2004, p. 46 
91 Penman & Zhang, 2002, p. 238 
92 Cf. Penman, 2004, p. 48 
93 Cf. Watts, 2003a, p. 208 
94 Cf. Penman, 2004, p. 561 
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At a second glance, conservatism simply stays what it is: a caution concept. Kieso et 
al. (2004, pp. 43) define conservatism as one of the constraints in the recognition and 
measurement concepts of financial reporting and therefore accounting:  
“Few conventions in accounting are as misunderstood as the constraint of 
conservatism. Conservatism means when in doubt choose the solution that will be 
least likely to overstate assets and income. Note that there is nothing in the 
conservatism convention urging that net assets or net income be understated. 
Unfortunately it has been interpreted by some to mean just that. […] If the issue is in 
doubt, it is better to understate than overstate net income and net assets. Of course, if 
there is no doubt, there is no need to apply this constraint.”95 
 
If there is doubt, caution and therefore conservatism help protect investors from false 
information and hope, present a company in the right way and give guidelines for 
managers, e.g. the lower-of-cost-or-market approach in valuing inventories.96 But 
without doubt, when there is actually no need for caution, using the “emergency”-
rules of conservatism reduce the decision usefulness of financial statements in 
masking true firm performance. So the understatement of net assets – which 
according to Kieso et al. (2004) should not emerge from conservatism – does exist 
due to these principles. That is what makes conservatism such a controversial topic.  
 
This is also true in the context with earnings quality. On the one hand conservatism 
restricts the numbers on the balance sheet to be reliable and not overstated which is 
good for the quality of earnings. On the other hand – through the convenient 
practical misinterpretation of the concept and the usage without doubt but as well 
through the fact that there have to be estimations of dangers and losses, which tend 
to include estimation errors – it favors earnings management e.g. in the creation of 
“cookie-jar-reserves” or makes the practice of “big baths” easier. Those two 
“concepts” were also described by Levitt (1998, pp. 3) as the illusions created by 
earnings management. He especially brought big bath charges in connection with 
conservatism. Therefore conservatism is often seen as unfavorable in the earnings-
quality-debate as the accounting information can get asymmetric and distorted97 and 
it is often related with respectively stated as an incentive for earnings management98. 
 
                                                 
95 Kieso et al., 2004, p. 46 
96 Cf. Kieso et al., 2004, p. 46 
97 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 278 
98 Cf. Abdelghany, 2005, pp. 1006 
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On the contrast Wagenhofer and Dücker (2007, p. 279) state that empirically caution 
respectively conservatism is associated with higher earnings quality as it leads to a 
more timely recognition of information at least for “unfavorable numbers”. During 
the tests they carried out in the second part of their paper, they used conservatism as 
a positive influence on earnings quality. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) consider 
conservatively formed earnings of high-quality as well. Another argument in favor of 
conservatism is that the asymmetric recognition is basically what the public asks for, 
because managers rather release information about positive numbers, hence, there 
need to be principles to ensure that losses are likewise recorded.99 
 
Watts (2003a) gives four reasons for conservatism in accounting all of which suggest 
that financial statement users are benefiting of it: 
? The first explanation is contracting where conservatism helps to solve the 
problems due to the existence of asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs and 
limited liability. The reasoning is based on debt and executive compensation 
contracts. For the first, conservatism creates a reliable lower bound value, for 
instance of net assets, for lenders and for the latter, it reduces agency cost that 
occur through the moral-hazard-situation of such contracts. 
? A company with understated net assets is less likely to face litigation costs than 
one with overstated net assets as the possibility of a successful suit seems smaller 
if the company “looks poorer”. 
? Through the faster recognition of losses the present value of taxes can be reduced, 
because the present value of taxable income is reduced, too. This is due to the 
strong link between tax and commercial law. 
? The political costs for standard setters and regulators are smaller with 
conservatism, as they are blamed if companies overstate their net assets and thus 
create stock market bubbles and the like. 
According to research the first two explanations are the strongest, but all are possible. 
Time-series evidence suggests that conservatism rose over time. A reason of this rise 
could be that the more conservatism explanations “kicked-in” over time. It started 
with contracting; then came taxes, regulation and finally litigation.100 
 
                                                 
99 Ball & Shivakumar, 2005, p. 88 
100 Cf. Watts,  2003b, pp. 291 
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In the attempt of measuring conservatism researchers developed three types of 
measures, all of which tend to either emphasize the extent to which earnings are 
asymmetrically deferred or the extent to which net assets are understated. They are 
either based on the relation between earnings and stock returns, on net assets, or 
earnings and accruals.101 
 
Francis et al. (2004) use stock returns – with a focus on the negative returns – as a 
reference construct for conservatism. Their measure is based on Basu’s (1997) widely-
used equation which focuses on the different sensitivity of earnings per share to 
positive and negative returns, i.e. “earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are higher 
for positive earnings changes than for negative earnings changes“102. It includes a 
binary dummy variable tiD ,  which indicates whether returns are positive or negative, 
i.e. 0, =tiD  when 0, ≥tiR  and 1, =tiD  when 0, <tiR . The other variables are the same 
as used in the measure/equation for timeliness of Section 3.6: 
tititititi
ti
ti RDRD
P
X
,,,2,1,10
1,
, εββαα +⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+=
−
.  The coefficient 1β  shows earnings’ 
sensitivity towards positive returns, )( 21 ββ +  towards negative returns. The degree of 
conditional conservatism, i.e. the difference in sensitivity of earnings between 
negative and positive returns, is measured through 2β , where a higher number 
signals more (conditional) conservatism. For the same matter the relation of the two 
coefficients 
1
21 )(
β
ββ +
 is used, too.103 
 
Zhang (2008, pp. 32) uses three further approaches to measure conservatism: the 
explanatory power of negative returns relative to the one of positive returns of the 
before cited equation, the time-series skewness of earnings, where conservatism 
causes a negative skewness of earnings, and accumulated non-operating accruals 
deflated by accumulated total assets, which summarizes the recording of bad news. 
The latter is consistent with Givoly and Hayn’s (2000, p. 292) use of “the sign and 
magnitude of accumulated accruals over time” to measure conservatism.  
 
                                                 
101 Cf. Watts, 2003b, pp. 288 
102 Basu, 1997, p. 3 
103 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 278, and Givoly et al, 2007, pp. 68 
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Unconditional conservatism is usually measured through book-to-market ratios to 
see if respectively how much book values are understated.104 For example Rajan et al. 
(2007) quantify conservatism this way. They define a conservative depreciation 
schedule in which the depreciation rate for each year is bigger than one that would be 
used with neutral accounting. Market values are being used as benchmarks for 
neutral accounting values. 
 
3.8 Value Relevance 
 
“Value relevance is the degree to which accounting earnings summarize information 
impounded in market prices. It is generally agreed upon that the greater the value 
relevance of earnings, the more useful it is for market participants when making 
investment decisions.“105 
 
Value relevant earnings are able to explain variations in returns. The better they are 
at explaining them the more desirable this attribute is for earnings.106 It also 
enhances the decision usefulness of earnings and captures the two accounting 
qualities of relevance and reliability, which are defined as most important by the 
FASB.107 
 
The interplay of relevance and reliability is described as follows108: There are many 
items that are necessary for a company and would be relevant to be put on the 
balance sheet, for instance brand equity, human capital or research and development 
expenses. No firm could function without its employees; they actually represent an 
asset to the company. The same can be said of R&D expenses. A company such as 
Microsoft could not survive in the future if they do not invest in R&D. So both R&D 
and human capital would be relevant information to be put on the balance sheet. – 
But this imposes the question of measurement and therefore reliability: How exactly 
can the worth of people for a company or the benefit of R&D be valued? What would 
the depreciation rate of these assets be? Although it is out of question that there is a 
benefit for the company, it is hard to quantify. So this leads back to the conservative 
principles used in accounting: “…when in doubt choose the solution that will be least 
                                                 
104 Cf. Brown, Jr. et al., 2006, p. 615 
105 Brown, Jr. et al., 2006, p. 607 
106 Cf. Francis et al., 2004, p. 972 
107 Cf. Francis et al., 2004, p. 972, and Entwistle & Phillips, 2003, p.85 
108 Cf. Entwistle & Phillips, 2003 
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likely to overstate assets and income.”109 So even if the information would be relevant 
for the valuation of the firm and its potential, the numbers need to be reliable or they 
should not be put on the balance sheet. The more value relevant earnings are the 
more reliable and relevant they are at the same time, so that there need not be a 
trade-off between those two primary accounting qualities.  
 
When measuring value relevance two approaches are possible: portfolio-returns and 
regression variation. With the first it is measured through “the total return that could 
be earned from a portfolio based on perfect foreknowledge of [accounting] earnings 
adjusted for market effects.”110 Hedge portfolios are formed on the foreknowledge in 
the change of earnings per share and of returns, their returns are pooled and the 
value relevance measure is calculated with the mean of the earnings-based portfolio 
scaled by the mean of the returns-based portfolio. The higher this number is the more 
value relevant are earnings.111 
 
For measuring value relevance through the regression variation a reference construct 
is necessary. As with timeliness and conservatism stock returns are usually used for 
this matter. The association between stock returns and earnings is estimated as 
follows: ti
ti
ti
ti P
X
R ,
1,
,
, εβα +⋅+=
−
. It is simply the inverse equation of the measure of 
timeliness. Alternatively, the equation also includes the year’s change in earnings 
tiX ,Δ : ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti P
X
P
X
R ,
1,
,
2
1,
,
1, εββα +Δ⋅+⋅+=
−−
. Again, the higher the explanatory power R2 of 
these equations is the higher is the earnings’ value relevance. The effect on earnings 
quality is a good one, too, as a high correlation between earnings and the market 
price is seen as desirable. The coefficient β  is known as the earnings response 
coefficient, i.e. it measures how much investors react to earnings numbers.112 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 Kieso et al., 2004, p. 46 
110 Brown, Jr. et al., 2006, p. 611 
111 Cf. ibid 
112 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 279 and Francis et al., 2004, p. 981 
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3.9 International Properties of Earnings Attributes 
 
There are several studies, of which a few are presented here, that examine 
international variations of earnings attributes due to different factors. The connection 
of earnings quality, represented through various earnings attributes, with the 
political-economical influence on accounting (e.g. law system, investor protection) 
and accounting systems is tested. 
 
Table 3: International Earnings Management 
 Data source: Leuz et al., 2003, pp. 514 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) carried out one of the most cited studies on earnings management. 
They connect its emergence with three country clusters that are grouped through the 
kind of ownership of companies, the investor protection, and the development of 
stock markets. To measure earnings management they use the smoothness of 
earnings, through the two ratios described in Section 3.3, the magnitude of accruals 
and small loss avoidance. Thirty-one countries with financial data from 1990 to 1999 
were included in the study. They find “that outsider economies with relatively 
dispersed ownership, strong investor protection, and large stock markets exhibit 
lower levels of earnings management than insider countries with relatively 
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concentrated ownership, weak investor protection, and less developed stock 
markets.”113 The magnitude of earnings management per country is shown in Table 2.  
It is interesting to notice that among the “Top Ten” nine of ten countries have a code-
law tradition and all six included countries with a German legal origin can be found 
in the middle of them.114 
 
Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) also relate earnings quality to investor protection. They 
tested data from thirty-one countries of the time-period between 1994 and 2003. 
Their hypothesis is that the better the investor protection in a country the higher is 
the earnings quality there. This is measured through the time-series earnings 
attributes of persistence, predictability and smoothness, and the quality of accruals. 
They find that earnings are less smooth in countries with low investor protection, but 
for the attributes of accrual quality and predictability their findings are inconsistent 
with their hypothesis and they cannot find a conclusion at all for persistence. 
 
Ball et al. (2000) measure earnings quality through timeliness and conservatism in 
common- and code-law countries. They explore the data from seven countries in the 
period from 1985 to 1995. Their analysis implies that although e.g. German 
accounting (as an example for a code-law country) is said to be more conservative 
than e.g. American accounting, the income in common-law countries exhibits 
significantly greater timeliness in the sense of conservatism. Watts (2003b, p. 293) 
explains this finding such that information asymmetries are solved privately within 
the firm without the use of external contracts in code-law countries. 
 
Finally, Van der Meulen et al. (2007) explore the differences of earnings attributes 
between the two accounting principles of U.S. GAAP and IFRS. They analyze value 
relevance, timeliness, predictability and accruals quality in this context and find no 
significant difference except for predictability being better for U.S. GAAP earnings. As 
they use a specific sample of high-growth firms in a period of economic downturn, 
their findings might not fully represent the average U.S. GAAP respectively IFRS 
adopter. 
 
                                                 
113 Leuz et al., 2003, p. 525 
114 Cf. Leuz et al., 2003, pp. 516 
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So, even though accounting systems are said to become more alike through 
international accounting standards115 and globalization seems to make the world “one 
village”, significant differences among countries and country clusters remain. For 
instance, disparities emerge because the focus of American standard setters lies on 
the protection and “support” of shareholders/investors while the German 
(commercial) law is dominated by the idea of creditor protection.116 This is also 
reflected in the differences of international properties of earnings attributes. 
 
                                                 
115 Cf. Land & Lang, 2002 
116 Cf. Küting & Weber, 2004, p. 549 
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4 Critical Considerations on Earnings Attributes 
 
After describing eight earnings attributes, ways to measure them and their 
international differences in the previous chapter, these characteristics of earnings are 
now critically analyzed through the calculation of cash flow examples. Additionally, 
the difficulties of empirical studies are shown and some further considerations are 
made.  
 
4.1 Cash Flow Examples 
 
The setting used for these examples is the “world of classical economics”117 with 
certainty and perfect markets. These are “daunting, unrealistic assumptions”118, but 
they are useful to get an idea how earnings attributes work and what they imply. 
Through simple cash flow examples considerations when earnings attributes are 
perfectly definitive/distinctive in this setting are presented. 
 
A cash flow is given for three periods, 3=T  and earnings are formed in deducting 
depreciation from the cash flows in every period, i.e. ttt DCFX −= , t∀ . Depreciation 
forms the only difference between earnings and cash flows and hence, constitutes the 
accrual component in the equation. Cash flows are exogenously given and occur in 
three types: steady (only with no interest), increasing, and decreasing. Due to perfect 
markets – which imply perfect competition – the present value of cash flows is 
zero.119 The examples are calculated with straight line, degressive and progressive 
depreciation. The scenario is completed in using no interest first and an interest of 
ten percent second.  
 
Now, when are earnings attributes perfect in this setting? 
? Persistence: Taking the equation from Section 3.1 the error terms can be ignored 
due to the setting of certainty and so tt XX ⋅+=+ βα1 . Earnings are perfectly 
persistent when β  is one. In this case α  equals the difference between 1X  and 
                                                 
117 Christensen & Demski, 2003, p. 34 
118 ibid 
119 Cf. Christensen & Demski, 2003, p. 38 
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2X , so that over time earnings grow steadily by this amount. Without thinking of 
the before used equations, one can also speak of perfectly persistent earnings if 
they stay exactly the same over time, i.e. 321 XXX == . In this case α  is zero. One 
can argue that β  is still one, but as it is no straight line anymore but rather only 
one steady point in the co-ordinate system a calculation of the slope coefficient 
causes a division through zero. So, it can be concluded that persistence is not 
captured perfectly through the regression equation. 
? Predictability: As predictability depends – logically and as expressed in Section 
3.2 – on persistence, it can be said, that if earnings are perfectly persistent they 
are likewise perfectly predictable. Using the regression, if β  is one the 
explanatory power 2R  equals one, too. The same is true if earnings are completely 
invariable over time, e.g. (10, 10, 10), as described above. 
? Volatility/Smoothness: Earnings would be smoothest if there is no change in 
earnings at all. This occurs when all earnings are equal, i.e. 321 XXX == . 
? Quality of accruals: In this setting depreciation is the only accrual. As the function 
of accruals is to correctly match costs with revenues, the depreciation needs to 
somewhat fit the cash flow time-line. This is the case with the so called economic 
depreciation which forms the change in (present) value, i.e. ttt PVPVED −= −1 .120 
The economic depreciation represents the relative-benefit-cost-allocation rule. 
Logically, the economic depreciation is present value preserving. This only fits 
with the clean surplus condition – which at this level means that the cumulative 
depreciation has to equal the initial book value – because the perfect 
market/competition assumption implies a present value of the project of zero. 
? Earnings Management: At its best, earnings management simply does not exist. 
Real earnings management can be excluded here as the cash flows are 
exogenously given. Still, the target of earnings management is difficult to assess 
and therefore it will be factored out for the examples.  
? Timeliness & Value Relevance: Both attributes consider the closeness to the 
(stock) market. Additionally to the fact, that they both have the same target, 
timeliness somewhat implies value relevance; if items are not value relevant there 
is no need for timeliness in their consideration. The more timely and value 
relevant earnings are the closer they are to their market value. In this setting this 
                                                 
120 Cf. Christensen & Demski, 2003, p. 39 
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market value and therefore perfectly timely and value relevant earnings equal 
economic income, i.e. tt EIX = , t∀ . This assumption fits well with Schipper and 
Vincent’s (2003) definition, that the earnings quality is the highest when earnings 
depict economic income, i.e. Hicksian income in their terminology. In the 
“normal” world economic income is an unobservable concept121 but in this setting 
it is a quantifiable measure. Economic income is defined as the difference in value 
between this period and the previous one plus this period’s cash flow, i.e. 
tttt CFPVPVEI +−= −1  with tPV  being the present value of the project at the point 
of time t.122  
? Conservatism: Given the contrasting views on conservatism it is hard to say what 
perfectly conservative earnings look like. Taking the approach of Rajan et al. 
(2007) conservative earnings are determined through the fact that the underlying 
book values are all lower than those created through neutral accounting 
respectively the depreciation for each period is higher than the corresponding 
“neutral” one, i.e. tt PVB <  resp. tt EDD > , t∀ . In this setting the properties of 
neutral accounting can be identified through the economic income, because that 
way all book values equal the present value of the project at this point in time (as 
required by Rajan et al.). Other measures of conservatism focus on the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings through the anticipation of losses. While Rajan 
et al.’s (2007) focus on unconditional conservatism, these concepts assess 
conditional conservatism. The latter requires a specific reaction or change in 
policy, e.g. an extraordinary depreciation, due to losses.123 As the form of 
depreciation is seen as given here, there are no such reactionary changes and thus 
conditional conservatism can not be depicted in the setting used. 
 
Without doing any examples yet, one can see that in their perfect distinctiveness, the 
time-series earnings attributes work out at the same time, at least in one direction: If 
earnings are perfectly smooth, they are perfectly persistent and thus predictable as 
well. The other way round earnings are always perfectly predictable if they are 
persistent, but the volatility/smoothness depends on α  and is only perfect if α  
equals zero.  
 
                                                 
121 Cf. Schipper & Vincent, 2003, p. 98 
122 Cf. Christensen & Demski, 2003, pp. 38 
123 Cf. Beaver & Ryan, 2005, pp. 269 
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Due to the way of definition timeliness and value relevance – which are characterized 
through the same target – always arise in pairs. When concluding that the quality of 
accruals is the highest here if economic depreciation is used, it also works with 
timeliness and value relevance.  
 
While for conservatism no ad-hoc-connection with the time-series earnings attributes 
can be found, it is for sure that it will not occur together with perfectly timely and 
value relevant earnings as well as perfect accruals: Timeliness and value relevance are 
presented through the market value equivalent of economic income and therefore 
neutral accounting. Hence, conservatism differs conceptually from them as it is 
explicitly defined through its deviation from neutral accounting.124 Although 
conditional conservatism cannot be depicted here, it still can be said, that for 
perfectly timely earnings it does not exist as conditional conservatism refers to the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
 
t 0 1 2 3 t 0 1 2 3 t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 100 100 100 CFt -300 50 100 150 CFt -300 150 100 50
Dt 0 -100 -100 -100 Dt 0 -50 -100 -150 Dt 0 -150 -100 -50
EDt 0 -100 -100 -100 EDt 0 -50 -100 -150 EDt 0 -150 -100 -50
Bt 300 200 100 0 Bt 300 250 150 0 Bt 300 150 50 0
PVt 300 200 100 0 PVt 300 250 150 0 PVt 300 150 50 0
Xt 0 0 0 0 Xt 0 0 0 0 Xt 0 0 0 0
EIt 0 0 0 0 EIt 0 0 0 0 EIt 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Examples where six earnings attributes are perfectly fulfilled at once 125 
 
The examples show that six earnings attributes are perfectly valid at once for one 
scenario respectively three cases. - Namely when there is no interest and cash flows 
fit exactly with the used depreciation, i.e. it completely “cancels out” cash flows so 
that earnings are (like economic income) all equally zero. Put in other words, the 
growth parameters of the cash flows and the depreciation are equal. Logically, this is 
the case for steady cash flows with straight line depreciation, increasing cash flows 
with progressive depreciation, and decreasing cash flows with degressive 
depreciation. For these three examples (as shown in Table 4) earnings are perfectly 
smooth, persistent, and predictable, because 0=tX , t∀ ; perfectly timely and value 
                                                 
124 Cf. Rajan et al., 2007 
125 All 18 calculated examples can be found in the appendix. 
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relevant due to the fact, that tt EIX = , t∀ ; and finally, the depreciation has the 
perfect accrual quality as tt EDD = , t∀ . All book values equal the present value of the 
project at this point in time, so according to Rajan et al. (2007) neutral accounting is 
used and thus, earnings are not conservative. 
 
For none of the other examples can a case where those earnings attributes are 
perfectly fulfilled at once be observed. When determining the best solutions for the 
examples with an interest rate of ten percent, i.e. where the different earnings 
attributes were closest to perfect, no concentration can be detected. Logically, those 
attributes that occur together already by definition do not differentiate. For instance, 
high quality accruals as well as timely and value relevant earnings always go together. 
Smoothness as does persistence (and predictability) “follows” them in two out of 
three cases. Together smoothness and persistence appear in only one of three 
examples. Following the definition of Rajan et al. (2007), conservatism is present in 
two of the three examples, where the density of well fulfilled earnings attributes is the 
highest.  
 
When thinking further it is obvious that smooth, persistent, and predictable earnings 
depend very much on the depreciation used and how well it fits with the occurring 
cash flows. The growth parameters of cash flows and depreciation need to be equal to 
get highly persistent and predictable earnings. Depreciation would have to be 
selected separately for each project and asset to fulfil this criterion. Such complete 
flexibility cannot be allowed with generally accepted accounting principles and thus, 
earnings management seems the last resource to achieve these attributes. This is 
assisted through the fact that real markets are not perfect. Hence, usually the present 
value of a project is unequal to zero and an economic depreciation would violate the 
clean surplus condition. So, virtual depreciation can always only be suboptimal. If 
stakeholders see persistent, predictable, and smooth earnings as desirable and the 
possibility that allowed depreciation methods fit exactly with the company’s projects 
and assets are low, little manipulations of those anyway suboptimal numbers hardly 
stand out and might help to meet the market’s expectations. Suboptimality is also a 
problem for the attributes of timeliness and value relevance. Their optimum, 
economic income, is unobservable in reality – as e.g. Schipper and Vincent (2003) 
point out.  
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In eighteen cases, book values are nine times conservative, six times liberal and thrice 
neutral.126 This has to do with the choice of cash flows and the fit between their 
growth parameters and the ones of the three depreciation methods used. It cannot be 
seen as a proof of any kind that accounting is conservative for the better part. For the 
best solutions with interest the smoothest earnings always occurred with 
conservatism, for all other attributes it was twice out of three times. So even in this 
setting conservatism stays an ambivalent topic, where it can be said that 
conservatism helps to artificially smooth out earnings but help them get closer to 
economic income as well. 
 
The earnings attributes only worked perfectly together for the cases of neutral 
accounting, which would strengthen standard setter’s recent view to prefer fair value 
accounting. But this only fits for a perfect market with no interest, i.e. a completely 
unrealistic setting. In none of the cases with interest economic income (and thus 
neutral accounting) fit with regular earnings. So, if it does not work out in a perfect 
world there is no sense in building rules on it in reality.  
 
4.2 Difficulties of Empirical Studies 
 
Most evidence and ideas on earnings quality that were presented so far are based on 
different empirical studies on the topic. The measurements and equations for the 
eight earnings attributes described in Chapter 3 were developed for this purpose. Due 
to different hypotheses often more than one way to measure an earnings 
characteristic was found. 
 
One of the biggest assumptions affects all market-based attributes. For timeliness, 
conservatism, and value relevance stock markets are used as reference constructs. 
Even though researchers are aware of the fact that today’s stock markets are not 
perfect they use them to gauge constructs like economic income that depend on this 
assumption. Additionally, through the cash flow examples of the previous section it 
was seen how inseparable economic income, economic depreciation and the likes are 
from perfect markets. As soon as present value does not equal zero anymore these 
constructs are out of reach when accounting properly according to the rules of GAAP. 
                                                 
126 Defined through the method used by Rajan et al. (2007) 
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Although the argument is fair, that yet no better benchmark was discovered than 
stock markets for this purpose, drastically put, “correlation with returns is, in part, 
correlation with changes in speculative beliefs.”127 Thus, it has to stay in mind that 
the comparison with stock markets for the market-based attributes is problematic 
and causes these characteristics to loose in significance.  
 
In reaction to the not perfect markets assumptions on the best shape of earnings 
attributes have to be made. The difficulty here is that those hypotheses are hard to 
check. Researchers do carry out robustness checks for their variables and hence, try 
to control for other explanations than those they got due to their assumptions. They 
point out themselves that they cannot be sure if all possibilities were controlled for. 
The impact of the many different influences on earnings attributes is not well enough 
explored and especially in cross-country comparisons difficulties arise.128 For 
instance Leuz et al. (2003, p.526) consider the complexity of institutional factors and 
their interdependence as a possible heaviness in their study. 
 
The choice of measures, samples and time-periods forms another difficulty of 
empirical studies. Although they are based on the same concept different measures 
for one earnings attribute exist and their outcome varies empirically. For instance 
Wagenhofer and Dücker (2007, p. 293) point out that there two used measures for 
volatility expand in opposite directions. Additionally, capturing whole accounting 
concepts like accruals is not easy. Only proxies can be developed, which then can 
cause the variations in outcome. Furthermore, the outcome of all empirical studies 
logically also depends on the sample used.129 Another problem is the chose time-
period. Schipper and Vincent (2003, p.100) state that even for the widely used one-
year-ahead predictions no conceptual basis exists. All this makes the outcomes of 
different studies pretty ambiguous. 
 
4.3 Further Considerations 
 
As the definitions of earnings quality differ widely it is hard to operationalize them. 
The usage of earnings attributes tries to solve this problem and gives a possibility of 
                                                 
127 Penman, 2003, p. 89 
128 Cf. Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006, p. 354 
129 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 282 
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measuring earnings quality – at least to some degree. An important flaw is the 
difficulty in distinguishing between positive and negative influences of the attributes 
on earnings quality. Seen in a positive light the fulfilment of an earnings 
characteristic stands for the enhanced decision usefulness of earnings. But then this 
meeting of the desired outcome can always be seen as a consequence of earnings 
management.130 This is due to the complexity of earnings management and 
compounded through the fact that all other attributes are used to assess the degree of 
earnings management or to find out about the incentives for it. So the downside of 
every other earnings attribute is always – as it was mentioned in Chapter 3 – its 
possibility to only be an outcome of the manipulation of earnings. 
 
Furthermore, there are some attribute “clusters”, where the earnings characteristics 
point by definition in the same direction and their measures are based on the same 
equations. This was also seen in the previous section, where in their perfect outcome 
some attributes have the same target, so that they appear in pairs. Examples are 
persistence and predictability as well as timeliness and value relevance. 
Consequential, (strong) correlations between the different earnings attributes are 
highly probable and have to be considered in the construction of an aggregated 
earnings quality measure.131 
 
Wagenhofer and Dücker (2007, pp. 282) investigate those correlations among the 
earnings attributes described in Chapter 3 for a sample of 148 Austrian stock 
exchange listed companies from 1996 to 2005. They find that theoretical suggested 
connections often do not hold in the empirical analysis as they seem to depend very 
much on the sample. Among the significant correlations predictability is quite 
interesting. It is pictured through two different measures and while the predictability 
of earnings for earnings is positively correlated with persistence the predictability of 
earnings for cash flows is negatively correlated. Volatility is negatively correlated with 
predictability and conservatism. In total there are only five out of twenty-eight 
correlations that are statistically significant with value relevance and the quality of 
accruals not being significantly correlated with any other attributes. As they point out 
themselves, their results do not only differ from theory but other empirical findings. 
 
                                                 
130 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, p. 281 
131 Cf. Wagenhofer & Dücker, 2007, pp. 280 
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Francis et al. (2004, pp. 975) provide a study of seven earnings attributes – accrual 
quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, 
conservatism – for a sample of an average of 1,471 U.S. companies per year during 
twenty-seven years from 1975 to 2001. They find positive correlations among all four 
accounting-based attributes – accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness 
– as well as for the three market-based attributes – value relevance, timeliness, 
conservatism – while there is relatively little overlap between those two groups. 
Except for the correlation of 0.67 between value relevance and timeliness the 
earnings attributes are not high enough correlated to subsume each other. 
 
When comparing these studies with the insight gained through the cash flow 
examples in the Section 4.1, Francis et al.’s (2004) results are more easily traceable. 
Only the connection between accrual quality, value relevance, and timeliness, which 
is supposedly strong, has no reflection in this study. Wagenhofer and Dücker’s (2007) 
small sample size – in relation to Francis et al. (2004) – in terms of both, the number 
of companies and years, might be the most obvious reason for their results not to fit 
completely with the theoretical ideas reflected in the examples and other empirical 
studies. 
 
Finally, the business environment and other influences have to be considered. 
Earnings attributes can differ substantially from one industry to another. The point 
here is that all attributes and measures have to be seen in the light of professional 
skepticism or simply called “common sense”, but there might always maintain a last 
doubt. Even in a classical economic setting with perfect markets and certainty 
earnings attributes give controversial ideas and do not show a complete and 
harmonious picture of the quality of earnings. To really give a sound interpretation of 
it as many circumstantial factors as possible have to be taken into consideration.132 
Earnings quality can be used as a framing concept for most issues in accounting133 
and this omnipresence of the topic has to be kept in mind when assessing it through 
the calculation of earnings attributes. 
 
 
                                                 
132 E.g. through the quality-of-earnings analysis described in Penman (2004, pp. 606). 
133 Cf. Amernic & Robb, 2002 
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5 Measuring Aggregated Earnings Quality 
 
In the following the attempts to measure earnings quality in an aggregated way are 
depicted from two angles: theory, which focuses on the earnings attributes described 
in Chapter 3, and practice, which rather deals with rankings and evaluations of 
different items in the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flows. 
 
5.1 Theory-based 
 
There are not too many papers that try to measure aggregated earnings quality from a 
theoretical side. Usually the focus lies only on one aspect of it respectively one 
earnings attribute as often a connection with some other factor, e.g. capital costs or 
institutional characteristics, is explored. Additionally, researchers tend to study quite 
often only one more complex earnings attribute like earnings management or 
conservatism but do not just use the measures suggested for those but also the ones 
for other earnings attributes, so that one earnings attribute is described through the 
other earnings characteristics. 
 
Abdelghany (2005) adopts three ways to measure earnings quality indirectly through 
earnings management from other publications - Leuz et al. (2003), Barton and Simko 
(2002) and Penman (2001). All three used ratios are also explained – at least in 
similar facets – in the previous chapter. From the actual four used measures in Leuz 
et al. (2003) Abdelghany (2005) only takes the first measure of 
volatility/smoothness, namely the standard deviation of operating income, i.e. 
earnings from operations, divided by the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations. From Barton and Simko (2002) he uses the earnings surprise indicator 
defined through the fraction of the beginning balance of net operating assets and 
sales. A smaller number indicates higher earnings quality. The approach taken from 
Penman (2001) considers the proximity of earnings to cash and is the one that was 
also presented by Auer (2004)134 as an earnings management measure specifically 
the ratio of operational cash flows divided by net income, i.e. earnings. As mentioned 
in Section 3.5 the possibility of real earnings management is somewhat ignored in 
                                                 
134 See also Section 3.5 
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this ratio. The exact ways of calculation are not included in Abdelghany’s (2005) 
paper.135 
 
The study is carried out on an industry as well as a company level with the data of 
ninety, randomly selected NYSE-listed companies in the time span of four years 
between 1999 and 2003 in five industries. With consistency among the measures, the 
companies and industries were classified in having low or high earnings quality; 
otherwise they are marked for further investigation. In not adding up the results of 
the single measures, Abdelghany (2005) avoids the possibility of getting a distorted 
aggregated result through the possible correlations among the single measures. The 
average result is that the whole sample had low earnings quality. For the industries 
there was only consistency in the banking, insurance and investment industry (low 
earnings quality) as well as the technology industry (high earnings quality).136  
 
The flaws of this study come with the fact that – even though represented through 
three measures – only earnings management is used as the (inverse) measure of 
earnings quality. But throughout this thesis it was shown that the quality of earnings 
does not only depend on the absence of earnings management. Among other factors 
there might still be difficulties in the application of GAAP or common accounting 
practices may simply not fit for the underlying business. So Abdelghany’s (2005) 
paper cannot be considered as a prime example as it is not carried out well and far 
enough, but it seems like a step into the right direction. 
 
While Abdelghany (2005) avoided to combine his measures for earnings quality 
respectively earnings management, Wagenhofer and Dücker (2007) and Francis et al. 
(2004) explored the properties of an aggregated earnings quality measure in 
analyzing the correlations among the earnings attributes137, but they did not suggest a 
way to combine them properly. However, especially in papers were the connectivity of 
earnings quality and some other factors is examined such a measure is often created 
in simply adding up or connecting in another way all, some, or variations of the 
before presented earnings attributes. For example Leuz et al. (2003, p. 511) combine 
their four earnings management measures, i.e. earnings attributes, in ranking them 
                                                 
135 Cf. Abdelghany, 2005, pp. 1007 
136 Cf. Abdelghany, 2005, pp. 1008 
137 See also Section 4.2 
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for all countries separately and then calculating an average country ranking. Penman 
and Zhang (2002, p. 243) take the arithmetic mean of their two measures of earnings 
quality. 
 
5.2 Practice-based 
 
While researchers rather study only one aspect of earnings quality, e.g. through one, 
two or a few earnings attributes, or focus on the possible considerations or problems 
in combining attributes, practitioners want to arrive at a conclusion through one 
single measure. 
 
Bellovary et al. (2005) developed a structure for what they call an EQA, i.e. an 
earnings quality assessment. They took a look at eight different models for rating 
earnings quality, identified the ideas and critical points behind them, and merged 
them into a catalogue of twenty criteria. The original models have been developed 
and used by the Center of Financial Research and Analysis, Empirical Research 
Partners, Ford Equity Research, Lev-Thiagarajan, Merill Lynch, Raymond James & 
Associates, S&P Core Earnings and UBS. Each of the twenty Bellovary-criteria gets a 
score between one and five points, summing up in the best case to 100 points. To 
distinguish between the earnings quality of different companies they give away 
grades according to the total score, which are similar to the rating of bonds. The 
criteria and ratings are shown in Table 5. 
 
The focus of the EQA as well as the eight original models lies in items of the balance 
sheet and income statement. To rate them expertise and experience in the field are 
required. This makes Bellovary et al. (2005, pp. 34) suggest that the assessment 
should be carried out by auditors as they are the logical choice for this responsibility 
with their knowledge and subpoena power as the first control authority. 
 
The definition that underlies the EQA is that earnings quality refers to the ability of 
earnings to reflect the company’s true earnings, to help predict future earnings and of 
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earnings being stable, persistent and invariable. Comparing this to the earnings 
attributes, the emphasis somewhat lies on the time-series properties of earnings.138 
 
Criteria Score 
Revenue recognition issues (Shifts of revenues to other periods: low EQA score of 1) 1-5 
Gross margin/sales ratio (High and improving relative to industry: high EQA score of 5) 1-5 
Operating earnings/ sales (High and improving relative to industry: high score) 1-5 
Earnings variability (Great variability: low score) 1-5 
Cash flow from operations exceeds net income (Greater difference: higher score) 1-5 
Expense recognition issues (Shifts of expenses to other periods: low score) 1-5 
Operating leases (Greater occurrence and amount: low score) 1-5 
R&D (Decreasing R&D: low score) 1-5 
Pension expenses and gains * 1-5 
Employee stock option expense (Pro froma and large impact on EPS: low score) 1-5 
Gain (loss) from asset sales/sales (Incidence is negative. Look at trend and industry) 1-5 
Acquisitions/dispositions (Evaluate soundness relative to goals) 1-5 
Discontinued operations * 1-5 
Ongoing restructuring charges * 1-5 
One-time items * 1-5 
Extraordinary items * 1-5 
Accounting changes * 1-5 
Reverses prior charges/provisions * 1-5 
Tax-rate percentage (High variance from statutory rate and high variance: low score) 1-5 
Share buyback/issuance (Examine degree and trend. High incidence: low score) 1-5 
       Total possible rating 100 
* (Consider trend and industry. Greater occurrence and amount: low score)   
Quality Grade Total Score 
Excellent A 85-100 
Good AB 69-84 
Fair B 52-68 
Marginal BC 35-51 
Poor C 20-34 
Table 5: Criteria in Earnings Quality Assessment & Ranking 
 Source: Bellovary et al., 2005, p. 35 
 
Badenhausen et al. (2005) present an earnings quality rating of the experts of Rate 
Financials Inc. for the S&P 500 Index companies in their article. Certain red flags are 
described. For instance expensing stock options, overoptimistic assumptions about 
future earnings, low tax rates, discontinued operations, corporate governance 
structures, inventory and free cash flow are seen as crucial points in the distinction 
between low and high quality earnings. They also overlap to some degree with the 
criteria of Bellovary et al. (2005).  
                                                 
138 Cf. Bellovary et al., 2005, p. 32 
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Rosenberg (2003) suggests a simple means of gauging earnings quality in comparing 
the growth of book value and operating earnings. If a company stopped all operations 
at the very minute, book value would indicate the worth of the company. So the 
growth rates do not have to be identical, but if they are somewhat close it can be 
counted as a positive sign towards earnings quality as a rise in book value is caused 
through retained earnings. 
 
In practice it is often only called earnings quality, but in fact a broader approach is 
taken in considering various influences on earnings respectively valuing the whole 
company. The aim of these practitioners is close to Penman’s (2004, p. 606) 
suggested quality-of-earnings analysis for which most valuation tools described in 
other parts of his book respectively in other books that deal with financial statement 
analysis and valuation are useful. It consists of an accounting quality, financial 
statement and red flag analysis. With the latter a “reviewing [of] financial statement 
ratios for warnings signs”139 is meant. It simply refers to points in reporting, which 
need some further investigation to remove all doubt that there might be something 
wrong. Penman (2004, p. 609) provides several flash points for thirteen different 
industries, where there is more than usual possibility for manipulation: For instance, 
in the banking industry credit losses (quality of loan loss provisions) are of high 
importance, for the automobile sector it is overcapacity (quality of depreciation 
allowances), and for pharmaceuticals the flash point lies with R&D (quality of R&D 
expenditures) and product liability (quality of estimated liabilities). Eight general 
red-flag indicators are also described in Penman (2004, p. 537): They include e.g. 
slower sales growth, decline in order backlog, and increasing sales returns, where the 
latter may indicate decreasing customer satisfaction. 
 
Practitioners take a few similar views as those expressed in theory through earnings 
attributes, especially with time-series characteristics. The attributes can be seen as 
red flags themselves. But even though some of their red flags seem logical one cannot 
always see the exact concept behind. The practice system in assessing earnings 
quality relies much more on expertise and experience in the field than statistics and 
exact numbers. In general practice-based measure split between being more focused 
in only looking at positions on the income statement and balance sheet or including 
the whole environment of the company. 
                                                 
139 Penman, 2004, p. 607 
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6 Summary & Conclusion 
 
This thesis dealt with the often quoted but ill-defined topic of earnings quality. The 
issue’s difficulties start in pleading the usage of earnings – in contrast to pro-forma-
earnings, residual income numbers, and cash flows – naturally continue in 
formulating an all-purpose definition and are somewhat explained through the many 
interested parties and the vast number of influential factors. 
 
While researchers try to generate simplified models to get easy understandable and 
interpretable results as – at least – an initial solution, practitioners take up a more 
comprehensive, all-at-once position. This causes – for the earnings quality debate – 
research to rely on statistics and studies and practice to build on experience and 
expertise. But these different angels do not rule out the interaction between them.  
The eight earnings attributes described in this paper – persistence, predictability, 
volatility & smoothness, quality of accruals, earnings management, timeliness, 
conservatism, and value relevance – are predominantly used in research but the 
definitions and explanations for their usage also reflect in practice-inspired 
approaches on earnings quality. Likewise, researchers also consider the earnings’ 
business environment and influences critically in their results. Some attempts on 
measuring aggregated earnings quality theory-based – through the in-depth-study 
and combination of earnings attributes – and practice-based – through the analysis 
of certain positions and red flags in the annual accounts – were described in the 
previous chapters. 
 
The whole earnings quality debate supposedly has a lot to do with the strong wish of 
people to value a firm with just one number. - So that they can know by looking only 
at this figure what a company is worth or if they should invest in it. In a perfect world 
a single number and its simple attributes could tell us about (its) quality, but 
unfortunately that is not the scenario we are living it. The cash flow examples of 
Section 4.1 have shown that earnings attributes are already controversial in a very 
basic setting with the assumptions of perfect markets and certainty. Additionally, a 
number that tells the exact quality of a company will always be very firm- and time- 
specific. This makes measuring earnings quality through one number a theoretically 
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irresolvable issue.140 There can only be a good but maybe no perfect solution for this 
problem on average. In taking a look at the whole company and its business 
practitioners already go in this direction. To find out about the quality of earnings in 
the best possible way all probable factors have to be taken into account. Only an 
analysis of all underlying activities and influences can give an as-close-to-reality-as-
possible picture of a company. One has to take time to look at all important factors.  
 
Finally, what becomes clear throughout this thesis is the fact that there are still many 
research opportunities in order to eventually create a relevant and reliable measure of 
earnings quality. But still, once the instrument of earnings quality is worked out it 
will apparently be one of the most important decision factors for the valuation of a 
company. 
 
                                                 
140 Cf. Cornell & Landsman, 2003, pp. 20 
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Appendix 
 
A. Complete Cash Flow Examples from Section 4.1 
 
The setting and considerations for these examples are described in Section 4.1. The 
calculation of the earnings attributes’ measures is additionally described in the table 
below. The examples, where six of eight earnings attributes are perfectly fulfilled (as 
shown in Table 4), are those three with neutral accounting. If Beta equals “#DIV/0” 
but D(X) is zero, persistence and predictability are still perfect. The best outcome for 
each earnings attribute for one form of depreciation and an interest rate of 0.1 is 
highlighted. 
 
Earnings 
Attribute Measure Description 
Perfect 
Outcome 
Persistence & 
Predictability 
12
23
XX
XXBeta −
−=   
Slope of the 
equation 
tt XX ⋅+=+ βα1  
Beta = 1 
Volatility/ 
Smoothness 1223)( XXXXXD −+−=  
Deviation of 
earnings along 
the time series 
D(X) = 0 
Quality of 
Accruals 112233),( DEDDEDDEDDEDD −+−+−=
Deviation 
between “normal” 
and economic 
depreciation 
D(ED,D) = 0
Timeliness & 
Value 
Relevance 
112233),( XEIXEIXEIXEID −+−+−=  
Deviation 
between 
economic income 
and earnings 
D(EI,X) = 0 
Conservatism 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∀≥
∀=
∀≤
=
tPVBliberal
tPVBneutral
tPVBveconservati
Accounting
tt
tt
tt
,:
,:
,:
 
Accounting is 
neutral when 
book values 
equal the present 
value of the 
project. 
- 
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a. Straight Line Depreciation 
 
i= 0     i= 0.1    
           
t 0 1 2 3  t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 100 100 100  CFt -300 110 121 133.1
Dt 0 -100 -100 -100  Dt 0 -100 -100 -100
EDt 0 -100 -100 -100  EDt 0 -80 -99 -121
Bt 300 200 100 0  Bt 300 200 100 0
PVt 300 200 100 0  PVt 300 220 121 0
Xt 0 0 0 0  Xt 0 10 21 33.1
EIt 0 0 0 0  EIt 0 30 22 12.1
 
           
Beta #DIV/0!  Beta 1.10 
D(X) 0  D(X) 23.1 
D(ED,D) 0  D(ED,D) 42 
D(EI,X) 0  D(EI,X) 42 
Accounting neutral  Accounting conservative 
           
t 0 1 2 3  t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 50 100 150  CFt -300 55 121 199.65
Dt 0 -100 -100 -100  Dt 0 -100 -100 -100
EDt 0 -50 -100 -150  EDt 0 -25 -93.5 -181.5
Bt 300 200 100 0  Bt 300 200 100 0
PVt 300 250 150 0  PVt 300 275 181.5 0
Xt 0 -50 0 50  Xt 0 -45 21 99.65
EIt 0 0 0 0  EIt 0 30 27.5 18.15
           
Beta 1  Beta 1.19 
D(X) 100  D(X) 144.65 
D(ED,D) 100  D(ED,D) 163 
D(EI,X) 100  D(EI,X) 163 
Accounting conservative  Accounting conservative 
           
t 0 1 2 3  t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 150 100 50  CFt -300 165 121 66.55
Dt 0 -100 -100 -100  Dt 0 -100 -100 -100
EDt 0 -150 -100 -50  EDt 0 -135 -104.5 -60.5
Bt 300 200 100 0  Bt 300 200 100 0
PVt 300 150 50 0  PVt 300 165 60.5 0
Xt 0 50 0 -50  Xt 0 65 21 -33.45
EIt 0 0 0 0  EIt 0 30 16.5 6.05
           
Beta 1  Beta 1.24 
D(X) 100  D(X) 98.45 
D(ED,D) 100  D(ED,D) 79 
D(EI,X) 100  D(EI,X) 79 
Accounting liberal  Accounting liberal 
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b. Progressive Depreciation 
 
i= 0     i= 0.1    
           
t 0 1 2 3  t 0 1 2 3 
CFt -300 100 100 100  CFt -300 110 121 133.1 
Dt 0 -50 -100 -150  Dt 0 -50 -100 -150 
EDt 0 -100 -100 -100  EDt 0 -80 -99 -121 
Bt 300 250 150 0  Bt 300 250 150 0 
PVt 300 200 100 0  PVt 300 220 121 0 
Xt 0 50 0 -50  Xt 0 60 21 -16.9 
EIt 0 0 0 0  EIt 0 30 22 12.1 
           
Beta 1  Beta 0.97 
D(X) 100  D(X) 76.9 
D(ED,D) 100  D(ED,D) 60 
D(EI,X) 100  D(EI,X) 60 
Accounting liberal  Accounting liberal 
           
t 0 1 2 3  t 0 1 2 3 
CFt -300 50 100 150  CFt -300 55 121 199.65 
Dt 0 -50 -100 -150  Dt 0 -50 -100 -150 
EDt 0 -50 -100 -150  EDt 0 -25 -93.5 -181.5 
Bt 300 250 150 0  Bt 300 250 150 0 
PVt 300 250 150 0  PVt 300 275 181.5 0 
Xt 0 0 0 0  Xt 0 5 21 49.65 
EIt 0 0 0 0  EIt 0 30 27.5 18.15 
           
Beta #DIV/0!  Beta 1.79 
D(X) 0  D(X) 44.65 
D(ED,D) 0  D(ED,D) 63 
D(EI,X) 0  D(EI,X) 63 
Accounting neutral  Accounting conservative 
           
t 0 1 2 3  t 0 1 2 3 
CFt -300 150 100 50  CFt -300 165 121 66.55 
Dt 0 -50 -100 -150  Dt 0 -50 -100 -150 
EDt 0 -150 -100 -50  EDt 0 -135 -104.5 -60.5 
Bt 300 250 150 0  Bt 300 250 150 0 
PVt 300 150 50 0  PVt 300 165 60.5 0 
Xt 0 100 0 -100  Xt 0 115 21 -83.45 
EIt 0 0 0 0  EIt 0 30 16.5 6.05 
           
Beta 1  Beta 1.11 
D(X) 200  D(X) 198.45 
D(ED,D) 200  D(ED,D) 179 
D(EI,X) 200  D(EI,X) 179 
Accounting liberal  Accounting liberal 
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c. Degressive Depreciation 
 
i= 0     i= 0.1    
           
t 0 1 2 3   t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 100 100 100   CFt -300 110 121 133.1
Dt 0 -150 -100 -50   Dt 0 -150 -100 -50
EDt 0 -100 -100 -100   EDt 0 -80 -99 -121
Bt 300 150 50 0   Bt 300 150 50 0
PVt 300 200 100 0   PVt 300 220 121 0
Xt 0 -50 0 50   Xt 0 -40 21 83.1
EIt 0 0 0 0   EIt 0 30 22 12.1
           
Beta 1  Beta 1.02 
D(X) 100  D(X) 123.1 
D(ED,D) 100  D(ED,D) 142 
D(EI,X) 100  D(EI,X) 142 
Accounting conservative  Accounting conservative 
           
t 0 1 2 3   t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 50 100 150   CFt -300 55 121 199.65
Dt 0 -150 -100 -50   Dt 0 -150 -100 -50
EDt 0 -50 -100 -150   EDt 0 -25 -93.5 -181.5
Bt 300 150 50 0   Bt 300 150 50 0
PVt 300 250 150 0   PVt 300 275 181.5 0
Xt 0 -100 0 100   Xt 0 -95 21 149.65
EIt 0 0 0 0   EIt 0 30 27.5 18.15
           
Beta 1  Beta 1.11 
D(X) 200  D(X) 244.65 
D(ED,D) 200  D(ED,D) 263 
D(EI,X) 200  D(EI,X) 263 
Accounting conservative  Accounting conservative 
           
t 0 1 2 3   t 0 1 2 3
CFt -300 150 100 50   CFt -300 165 121 66.55
Dt 0 -150 -100 -50   Dt 0 -150 -100 -50
EDt 0 -150 -100 -50   EDt 0 -135 -104.5 -60.5
Bt 300 150 50 0   Bt 300 150 50 0
PVt 300 150 50 0   PVt 300 165 60.5 0
Xt 0 0 0 0   Xt 0 15 21 16.55
EIt 0 0 0 0   EIt 0 30 16.5 6.05
           
Beta #DIV/0!  Beta -0.74 
D(X) 0  D(X) 10.45 
D(ED,D) 0  D(ED,D) 30 
D(EI,X) 0  D(EI,X) 30 
Accounting neutral  Accounting conservative 
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B. Abstracts 
 
a. English Abstract 
 
This thesis deals with the often quoted but ill-defined topic of earnings quality and 
gives an overview of the topic. At first the term is defined, the usage of earnings in 
contrast to pro-forma-earnings, residual income, and cash flows is explained, and the 
different perspectives and influential factors on it are described. The main part 
consists of the description of eight earnings attributes – persistence, predictability, 
volatility & smoothness, quality of accruals, earnings management, timeliness, 
conservatism, and value relevance –, the way they are being measured, and their 
international differences. Subsequently, these attributes are analyzed in a setting of 
certainty and perfect markets through cash flow examples and some further critical 
points are considered for these characteristics of earnings. The examples show that 
even in a very basic setting earnings attributes already tend to be controversial. 
Thereafter, the possibilities and attempts to measure aggregated earnings quality in 
two ways – theory- and practice-based – are discussed. A summary and conclusion 
form the end of this paper. 
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b. German Abstract 
 
Diese Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit dem häufig genannten aber schlecht definierten 
Thema der Ergebnisqualität und gibt einen Überblick darüber. Zuerst wird der 
Begriff definiert, die Verwendung von Ergebnissen im Vergleich zu Pro-Forma-
Ergebnissen, Residualeinkommen und Cashflows wird erklärt und die verschiedenen 
Sichten darüber sowie beeinflussenden Faktoren werden beschrieben. Im Hauptteil 
werden acht Ergebniseigenschaften – Beständigkeit, Prognosefähigkeit, Volatilität & 
Glättung, Qualität der Periodenabgrenzungen, Bilanzpolitik, Zeitnähe, Vorsicht und 
Wertrelevanz –, deren Messung und internationale Unterschiede behandelt.  
Anschließend werden diese Eigenschaften im Rahmen der Annahmen von Sicherheit 
und perfekten Märkten anhand von Cashflow-Beispielen analysiert und weitere 
kritische Punkte dieser Ergebnischarakteristika aufgezeigt. Die Bespiele zeigen, dass 
auch in einem sehr einfachen Szenario die Ergebniseigenschaften bereits zu 
kontroversen Resultaten führen. Schließlich werden die Möglichkeiten und Versuche 
diskutiert Ergebnisqualität aggregiert in zwei Formen – auf Basis der Theorie und der 
Praxis - zu messen. Eine Zusammenfassung mit Fazit beendet die Arbeit. 
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